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Manni: National Cable & Telecommunications Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Ser
NATIONAL CABLE & TELECOMMUNICATIONS ASS'N v. BRAND
X INTERNET SERVICES: A WAR OF WORDS, THE EFFECT OF
CLASSIFYING CABLE MODEM SERVICE AS
AN INFORMATION SERVICE
I.

INTRODUCTION

The Internet is the fastest emergent communications network
of all time.' The Internet started as the ARPANET [Advanced Research Project Agency Net], a military communications devise that
2
eventually evolved into the Internet we experience today. Although the Internet was originally built for use by the scientific research community, it is currently dominated by the commercial
3
sector.
A majority of residential Internet users utilize their telephone
lines to access the Internet via a modem which creates a dial-up
connection. 4 This type of connection is referred to as narrowband
service. 5 Because narrowband service has a low data transmission
1. See Mark A. Lemley & Lawrence Lessig, The End of End-to-End: Preservingthe
Architecture of the Internet in the Broadband Era, 48 UCLA L. Rv. 925, 930 (2001)
("The Internet is the fastest growing network in history. In its thirty years of existence, its population has grown a million times over.").
2. See SHARON K. BLACK, TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAw IN THE INTERNET AGE
§ 1.3.2 (Academic Press 2002) (describing evolution of Internet). The NSFNET
was developed after the ARPANET. See id. The NSFNET provided a research computer network for projects funded by the National Science Foundation ("NSF").
See id. In 1992, "the World Wide Web technology was released .... " Id. By 1995,
.the NSFNET closed and the new Internet officially opened." Id.
3. See Press Release, UCLA Henry Samueli School of Eng'g and Applied Sci.,
Internet Began 30 Years Ago at UCLA (Jan. 6, 1999) (on file with author), available
at http://www.engineer.ucla.edu/stories/netis30.htm (discussing origin and development of Internet). The Advanced Research Projects Agency ("ARPA")
funded ARPANET. See id. It was developed to facilitate ARPA scientists' access to
'the special capabilities that existed in the many unique computers that ARPA was
supporting." Id. In the 1970s, the network consisted of 64 host computers. See id.
That number expanded rapidly, and by 1999 there were over 50 million host computers. See id.
4. See ANGELE A. GILROY & LENNARD G. KRUGER, BROADBAND INTERNET ACCESS:
AND ISSUES 1 (Aug. 3, 2005) (describing Internet access).
"The
modem converts analog signals (voice) into digital signals that enable the transmission of 'bits' of data." Id. "The highest speed modem used with a traditional
BACKGROUND

phone line .. . [is] a 56k modem.. .

."

Id. The 56k modem "offers a maximum

data transmission rate of about 45,000 bits per second ("bps")." Id.
5. See id. (describing 56K connection as narrowband); In the Matter of Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to the Internet over Cable Modem and
Other Facilities, 17 F.C.C.R. 4798, 4802
9 n.19 (2002) [hereinafter Declaratory
Ruling] (indicating "narrowband" refers to "Internet access service that is designed
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rate, its limitations become apparent when attempting to access
more sophisticated content on the World Wide Web. 6 After dial-up
narrowband service achieved widespread popularity, broadband Internet access became available. 7 Broadband access refers to a set of
technologies capable of delivering high-speed and high capacity Internet access over an "always on" connection. 8
Currently, cable operators provide broadband Internet access
using cable modem service, while telephone companies provide it
in the form of digital subscriber line service ("DSL").9 Telephone
and cable companies quickly deployed broadband access because
most homes already had telephone lines and cable wiring installed. 10 Generally, cable and telephone companies follow two
business models.'" They either provide Internet access directly to
the consumer themselves, or they contract with an independent Internet service provider ("ISP") to deliver Internet access. 12 "A] s of
to operate at speeds of less than 200 kilobits-per-second ("Kbps") in both
directions").
6. See GILROY & KRUGER, supra note 4, at 1 (noting limitation of narrowband
Internet access compared to broadband Internet access).
9 (noting sequence of In7. See Declaratory Ruling, 17 F.C.C.R. at 4802-03
ternet service deployment).
10 (indicating broadband Internet service provides access
8. See id. at 4805
to Internet at speeds significantly faster than telephone dial-up service). The Federal Communications Commission ("FCC") defines high-speed Internet access
generally as:
[A] service that "enables consumers to communicate over the Internet at
speeds that are many times faster than the speeds offered through dial-up
telephone connections" and that enables subscribers to "send and view
content with little or no transmission delay, utilize sophisticated 'realtime' applications, and take advantage of other high-bandwidth services."
1 n.2 (referencing Applications for Consent to the Transfer of ConId. at 4799
trol of Licenses and Section 214 Authorizations by Time Warner, Inc. and America
Online, Inc., Transferors to AOL Time Warner, Inc., Transferee, 16 F.C.C.R. 6547,
6572 63 (2001)). An "always on" connection is a continuous connection meaning the user does not need to dial-up to access the Internet. See GILROY & KRUGER,
supra note 4, at I (describing attributes of broadband access).
9. See DeclaratoryRuling 17 F.C.C.R. at 4802-03 9 (describing primary methods for providing high-speed Internet access). Wireless and satellite technologies
also provide broadband Internet access, but to a lesser extent. See id. at 4803 9.
Broadband Internet access provided by cable modem service utilizes the coaxial
cable wires that also deliver cable television service. See GILROY & KRUGER, supra
note 4, at 3 ("DSL is a modem technology that converts existing copper telephone
lines into two-way high speed data conduits.").
10. See Brand X Internet Servs. v. FCC, 345 F.3d 1120, 1124 (9th Cir. 2003)
(indicating ease of deployment due to existing hardware connections to consumers' homes), rev'd sub nom. Nat'l Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet
Servs., 125 S.Ct. 2688, 2696 (2005).
11. See Nat'l Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 125 S.Ct.
2688, 2696 (2005) (indicating existence of two possible business models).
12. See id. (describing business models). When cable and telephone companies contract with an independent ISP to deliver Internet access, the ISP leases
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December 31, 2004, there were 37.9 million high-speed lines connecting homes and businesses to the Internet in the United States
... "13 Currently, cable modem service is the most widely sub14
scribed to technology for high-speed Internet access.
Because broadband access supports faster connection speeds,
' 15
it has the potential to change the Internet and "how it is used."
"[I] t is possible that many of the applications that will best exploit
the technological capabilities of broadband, while also capturing
the imagination of consumers, have yet to be developed." 16 The
private sector primarily undertook the task of deploying technolo17
gies to provide broadband Internet access to consumers.
Ever since high-speed Internet access became widely available,
if and how these new technologies should be regulated has created
controversy and uncertainty. 18 In 1998, the Federal Communications Commission ("FCC") classified DSL service as a "telecommunications service," regulating it as a common carrier. 19 In contrast,
their "transmission facilities." See id. (noting that independent ISPs can lease existing "transmission facilities" to deliver Internet access).
13. GILROv & KRUGER, supra note 4, at 4. The 37.9 million high-speed lines
represents "a growth rate of [seventeen percent] during the second half of 2004."
Id. (noting status of broadband development).
14. See INDUS. ANALYSIS AND TECH. Dry. WIRELINE COMPETITION BUREAU, FCC,
HIGH-SPEED SERVICES FOR INTERNET ACCESS: STATUS AS OF DECEMBER 31, 2004, 2
(July 2005) (indicating 13.8 million subscribers to DSL service and 21.4 million
subscribers to cable modem service).
15. GILROY & KRUGER, supra note 4, at 2 (explaining why broadband is important). The authors list the following examples of the potential services and uses
that broadband access can support:
For example, a two-way high speed connection could be used for interactive applications such as online classrooms, showrooms, or health clinics,
where teacher and student (or customer and salesperson, doctor and patient) can see and hear each other through their computers. An "always
on" connection could be used to monitor home security, home automation, or even patient health remotely through the web. The high speed
and high volume that broadband offers could also be used for bundled
services where, for example, cable television, video on demand, voice,
data, and other services are all offered over a single line.
Id.
16. Id.
17. See id. at 4 (indicating private sector is financing and implementing deployment of broadband).
18. See Carl E. Kandutsch, Brand X Decision: Questions and Opportunities, How
Will Small Providersof Voice and DataServices Compete Without a Network?, BROADBAND
PROPS., Aug. 2005, at 48, 50 (describing two potential regulatory approaches: (1)
regulation based on common carrier principles traditionally applied to telephone
industry, or (2) deregulatory approach aimed at promoting capital investment necessary to deliver broadband to all Americans).
19. See In the Matters of Deployment of Wireline Services Offering Advanced
Telecommunications Capability, 13 F.C.C.R. 24012, 24030-31,
35-37 (1998)
[hereinafter Wireline Order] (classifying DSL service as telecommunications ser-
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the FCC "declined to determine a regulatory classification for, or to
regulate, cable modem service on an industry-wide basis." 20 Because of the lacking regulatory guidance, courts were inconsistent
in classifying Internet access via cable modem service. 21 This created an inconsistent regulatory environment in which the regulation of high-speed Internet access differed depending on the
platform used - DSL, cable modem service, or other - and a lack of

clear guidance with respect to how cable modem service would or
22
should be regulated.
In response to the inconsistency, the FCC issued a notice of
inquiry to ascertain the appropriate framework for regulating cable
modem service. 23 At the conclusion of its inquiry, the FCC entered
the Declaratory Ruling concluding that cable modem service is an
information service as defined by the Communications Act of 1934
("Communications Act") and, therefore, is not subject to Communication Act's Title II common carrier obligations.2 4 As a result,
vice, thus requiring telephone companies offering DSL service to make telephone
lines used to transmit DSL service available to competing ISPs on nondiscriminatory, common-carrier terms). For a discussion of Title II's (of the Communication
Act's) basic requirements, see infra notes 55-57 and accompanying text.
20. DeclaratoryRuling, 17 F.C.C.R. 4798, 4800-01
2 (2002) (providing background information regarding FCC action regarding cable modem service regulation); seeAT&T Corp. v. City of Portland, 216 F.3d 871, 879 (9th Cir. 2000) ("Thus
far, the FCC has not subjected cable broadband to any regulation, including common carrier telecommunications regulation."); see also Nat'l Cable & Telecomms.
Ass'n v. Gulf Power Co., 534 U.S. 327, 338 (2002) (noting "the FCC . .. has reiterated that it has not yet categorized Internet service" in context of access provided
by cable companies).
21. Compare AT&T Corp., 216 F.3d at 880 (holding "transmission of Internet
service ... over cable broadband facilities is a telecommunications service under
the Communications Act"), with MediaOne Group, Inc. v. County of Henrico, 97
F. Supp. 2d 712, 715 (E.D. Va. 2000) (concluding cable modem service is cable
service), and Gulf Power Co. v. FCC, 208 F.3d 1263, 1277-78 (11th Cir. 2000) (concluding Internet service provided by cable companies is not cable service, and that
Internet service is not telecommunications service).
22. See DeclaratoryRuling, 17 F.C.C.R. at 4819 9132 ("The Communications Act
does not clearly indicate how cable modem service should be classified or regulated; the relevant statutory provisions do not yield easy ...

answers .

.

. and the

case law interpreting those provisions is extensive and complex."). For examples
and discussion of the varying treatment of cable modem service by the courts, see
infra notes 89-129 and accompanying text.
23. See In the Matter of Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to the Internet Over Cable and Other Facilities, 15 F.C.C.R. 19287, 19293-308 9 14-56
(2000) [hereinafter Notice of Inquiry] (outlining goal of inquiry and issues FCC
sought comment on regarding regulation of cable modem service and its potential
effect on other high-speed Internet access platforms).
24. See Declaratory Ruling, 17 F.C.C.R. at 4802
7 (concluding that cable
modem service, as presently offered, is "interstate information service" with no separate telecommunications service offering). For a discussion of the common carrier obligations, see infra notes 55-58 and accompanying text.
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cable operators offering cable modem service did not have the
same obligation as DSL providers to open their transmission facilities to competing ISPs.2 5 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals va-

cated the Declaratory Ruling to the extent it concluded that cable
modem service is not a telecommunications service. 2 6 In overriding
the FCC's classification, the Ninth Circuit held stare decisis compelled adherence to its circuit precedent. 2 7 Although the FCC is
the agency typically responsible for regulating cable modem services, in effect, the court made this important and complex policy
decision instead.2 8 Additionally, the Ninth Circuit's opinion raised
25. For a discussion of common-carrier obligations imposed on telecommunications service providers, see infra notes 55-59 and accompanying text.
26. See Brand X Internet Servs. v. FCC, 345 F.3d 1120, 1132 (9th Cir. 2003)
(concluding Declaratory Ruling conflicted with their conclusion that cable modem
service is, in part, telecommunications service), rev'd sub nom. Nat'l Cable &
Telecomms. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 125 S.Ct. 2688 (2005).
27. See id. at 1128-32 (explaining AT&T Corp. in detail and discussing reasoning for following Circuit precedent). The Ninth Circuit deferred to their holding
in AT&T Corp. v. City of Portland, 216 F.3d 871 (9th Cir. 2000), that cable modem
service was a telecommunications service. See id. at 1132 (noting Ninth Circuit and
Supreme Court precedent require adherence to AT&T Corp.). AT&T Corp. was
decided before the FCC issued the Declaratory Ruling classifying cable modem service as an information service. See DeclaratoryRuling 17 F.C.C.R. at 4831 1 56-58
(acknowledging and distinguishing Ninth Circuit's consideration of proper regulatory classification for cable modem service in AT&T Corp.).
28. See Brand X Internet Servs., 345 F.3d at 1132 (vacating FCC conclusions in
DeclaratoryRuling to extent they conflicted with Ninth Circuit precedent). Section
151 of the Communications Act designates the FCC as the agency with authority to
execute and enforce the provision of the Act with respect to wire and radio communication. 47 U.S.C. § 151 (2000) (pending legislation S.1753, 109th Cong. (1st
Sess. 2005)) ("[T]here is created a commission to be known as the 'Federal Communications Commission,' which shall be constituted as hereinafter provided, and
which shall execute and enforce the provisions of this chapter."). Section 154(i),
titled "Duties and Powers," provides that "[tihe Commission [FCC] may perform
any and all acts, make such rules and regulations, and issue such orders, not inconsistent with this chapter, as may be necessary in the execution of its functions." Id.
§ 154(i) (2000). Section 157(a), titled "New Technologies and Services," states
that "[i]t shall be the policy of the United States to encourage the provision of new
technologies and services to the public." Id. § 157(a) (pending legislation S.2256,
109th Cong. (2d Sess. 2006)). Further, section 706 of the Telecommunications
Act of 1996 provides that:
The Commission and each State commission with regulatory jurisdiction
over telecommunications services shall encourage the deployment on a
reasonable and timely basis of advanced telecommunications capability to
all Americans . . . by utilizing, in a manner consistent with the public

interest, convenience, and necessity, price cap regulation, regulatory forbearance, measures that promote competition in the local telecommunications market, or other regulating methods that remove barriers to
infrastructure investment.
Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, Title VII, § 706(a), 110
Stat. 56, 153 (1996), reprintedin 47 U.S.C. § 157 notes at 121 (West 2000) [hereinafter Section 706]. Finally, Section 706(b) states if the FCC concludes that advanced telecommunications capability is not being deployed to all Americans in a
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administrative law issues concerning when a court should defer to
an agency interpretation of a statute it has authority to administer. 29 By resolving these issues, the Supreme Court in National Cable
& Telecommunications Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Services took an important step in clarifying the direction that regulation of cable modem
service will take and established a hierarchy for statutory interpreta30
tions when agencies and courts clash.
This Note examines the statutory construction of the Communications Act of 1934 ("Communications Act"), as amended by the
Telecommunications Act of 1996 ("1996 Act"), and the effect of
classifying cable modem service as an information service. Section
II provides the factual setting in which the Supreme Court decided
National Cable and Telecommunications Association v. Brand X Internet
32
Services.31 Section III provides the legal backdrop for the opinion.
This section also includes an overview of the relevant provisions of
the Communications Act and 1996 Act,3 3 an overview of the FCC's

response to cable modem service3 4 and a discussion of case law interpreting Internet service and cable modem service in the context
of the Communications Act, as amended.3 5 Additionally, section III
provides an overview of the deferential standard used by courts
when reviewing an agency's interpretation of a statute it has jurisdiction to administer.3 6 Section IV outlines the Supreme Court's
reasoning and holding, and provides a critical analysis of the opin-

reasonable and timely fashion, "it shall take immediate action to accelerate deployment of such capability by removing barriers to infrastructure investment and by
promoting competition in the telecommunications market." Id. § 706(b).
29. For a discussion of the deference given to agency interpretations of statutes, see infra notes 130-43 and accompanying text.
30. For a further discussion of the impact of Nat'l Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n v.
Brand X Internet Serus., see infra notes 171-91 and accompanying text.
31. For a further discussion of the facts of Nat'l Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n v.
Brand X Internet Servs., see infra notes 39-49 and accompanying text.
32. For a further discussion of the legal backdrop of Nat'l Cable & Telecomms.
Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., see infra notes 50-143 and accompanying text.
33. For a further discussion of the Communications Act and 1996 Act, see
infra notes 50-66 and accompanying text.
34. For a further discussion of the FCC's response to cable modem service,
see infra notes 67-88 and accompanying text.
35. For a further discussion of case law interpreting Internet service and cable
modem service, see infra notes 89-129 and accompanying text.
36. For a further discussion of the Chevron doctrine and court deference to
agency interpretations, see infra notes 130-43 and accompanying text.
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ion.3 7 Finally, section V discusses the potential impact of the "infor38
mation service" classification.

II.

FACTS

The regulation of broadband Internet access over cable
modem service hinges on two categories of regulated entities as defined by the Communications Act, as amended by the 1996 Act:
39
telecommunications carriers and information service providers.
"The [Communications] Act regulates telecommunications carriers, but not information-service providers, as common carriers" that
are subject to mandatory requirements under Title II of the Communications Act. 40 Even though information service providers are
not subject to mandatory common-carrier regulation under Title II,
they are not totally unregulated because the FCC "has jurisdiction
to impose additional regulatory obligations under its Title I ancillary jurisdiction to regulate interstate
and foreign

communications.

'4 1

In September of 2000, the FCC began informal rule-making
proceedings and issued a notice of inquiry to determine what type
of regulatory treatment should apply to cable modem service. 42 In
37. For a further discussion of the narrative analysis and critical analysis, see
infra notes 144-91 and accompanying text.
38. For a further discussion of the potential impact of the "information service" classification, see infra notes 192-212 and accompanying text.
39. See Nat'l Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 125 S. Ct.
2688, 2696 (2005) (noting relevance of telecommunications carriers and information service providers as defined in Communications Act, as amended); see also 47
U.S.C. § 153(20) (2000) (defining "information service"); 47 U.S.C. § 153(44)
(2000) (defining "telecommunications carrier").
40. See Nat'l Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n, 125 S.Ct. at 2696; see also 47 U.S.C.
§ 153(44) (2000) ("A telecommunications carrier shall be treated as a common
carrier under this chapter only to the extent that it is engaged in providing telecommunications services . . ").
41. Nat'l Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n, 125 S. Ct. at 2696 (citation omitted).
"These two statutory classifications originated in the late 1970's, as the Commission
[FCC] developed rules to regulate data-processing services offered over telephone
wires." Id. At that time, the FCC differentiated between "basic" and "enhanced"
services. See id. (noting FCC's "regime" was called "Computer I"). Basic services
were like standard telephone service, while enhanced services encompassed data
processing services over telephone wires. See id. at 2696-97 (describing difference
between Computer II classifications). The FCC defined these terms from the point
of view of the end-user's perception of the service being offered. See id. (explaining Computer II rules). The distinction between the two classifications turned on
how the service and the customer-supplied information interacted. Id. at 2697
(describing and comparing differences between "basic" and "enhanced" services).
42. SeeBrand X Internet Servs. v. FCC, 345 F.3d 1120, 1125-26 (9th Cir. 2003),
rev'd sub nom. Nat'l Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 125 S.Ct.
2688 (2005) (discussing substance of notice of inquiry). The FCC wanted to "determine what regulatory treatment, if any, should be accorded to cable modem
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March of 2002, the FCC issued its DeclaratoryRuling in which it "concluded that broadband Internet service provided by cable companies is an 'information service,' but not a 'telecommunications
service' under the Communications Act . . . . 4 The FCC con-

cluded that:
[T]o the extent they provide [cable modem] service, cable
operators would be subject to regulation not as cable service providers under Title VI of the [1996] Act, nor as
common carriers under Title II, but rather as. . information service [providers] under the less stringent provisions
44
of Title 1.
Several parties in different circuits petitioned for review of the
DeclaratoryRuling.4 5 In April of 2002, all appeals were transferred to

the Ninth Circuit and consolidated with Brand X Internet Services'
service and the cable modem platform used in providing this service." Id. at 1126
(citing In the Matter of Inquiry Concerning High Speed Access to the Internet
Over Cable and Other Facilities, 15 F.C.C.R. 19287, 19293 (2000)).
43. Nat'l Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n, 125 S. Ct. at 2697. The FCC issued the
DeclaratoryRuling "after receiving some 250 comments and meeting with a variety
of industry representatives, consumer advocates, and state and local government
officials . ..

."

Brand XInternet Servs., 345 F.3d at 1126. The FCC said it sought to

resolve the controversy surrounding the regulatory treatment of broadband Internet access through cable modem service. See Declaratory Ruling, 17 F.C.C.R.
4798, 4799-800 1 (2002) (noting purpose of inquiry).
44. Brand XInternet Servs., 345 F.3d at 1126 (citations omitted) (noting effect
of FCC's conclusions and FCC request for comment regarding implications of
their conclusions). To address the regulatory implications of the Declaratory Ruling, the FCC filed a notice of proposed rulemaking with the DeclaratoryRuling. See
id. (describing purpose). In the notice the FCC sought comments about:
(1) the implications of the classification for the Commission's parallel
rulemaking with respect to DSL service; (2) the scope of the Commission's jurisdiction to regulate cable modem service, including whether
there are any constitutional limitations on the exercise of that jurisdiction; (3) the need, if any, to require cable operators to provide access to
competing ISPs; (4) the effects of the regulatory classification on the marketplace for and the continued deployment of broadband service; (5)
"the role of state and local franchising authorities in regulating cable
modem service"; and (6) "the relationship between our classification determination and statutory or regulatory provisions concerning pole attachments, universal service, and the protection of subscriber policy."
Id. at 1126-27 (citations omitted).
45. See id. at 1127 ("Seven different petitions for review of the Commission's
ruling were filed in the Third, Ninth, and District of Columbia Circuits."). The
petitioners contended "that the FCC should have made an additional determination" after concluding that cable modem service is an information service. Id.
Three groups emerged: one group asserted that cable modem service was an information service and a telecommunications service, another asserted that cable
modem service was an information service and a cable service, and a third asserted
that the information service classification should be applied to "DSL service provided by telephone companies." Id. (listing petitioners' contentions).
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appeal. 4 6 In October of 2003, the Ninth Circuit issued its opinion
in which it concluded that the court was bound by its circuit precedent in AT&T Corp. v. City of Portland4 7 which held that cable
modem service is a "telecommunications service." 48 The FCC ap-

pealed to the United States Supreme Court, which granted certiorari to "settle the important questions of federal law that these cases
49
present."
III.
A)
i.

BACKGROUND

Classification of Cable Modem Service

Regulatory Authority Under the Communications Act

In 1934, Congress passed the Communications
tablished the FCC "[f] or the purpose of regulating
foreign commerce in communication by wire and
make available, so far as possible, to all the people

Act, which esinterstate and
radio so as to
of the United

States . . . efficient, Nation-wide, and world-wide wire and radio

communications service with adequate facilities at reasonable
charges .... -50 Title I of the Communications Act states that the
Act "appl[ies] to all interstate and foreign communication by wire
or radio .... 51 Congress created the FCC to act as the "'single
Government agency' with 'unified jurisdiction' and 'regulatory
power over all forms of electrical communication, whether by telephone, telegraph, cable, or radio,"' and as a result, was given broad
authority.5 2 Thus, the FCC's regulatory power is not limited by specific forms of communication described in the Communications
Act. 53

46. See id. (noting Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation transferred petitions to Ninth Circuit).
47. 216 F.3d 871 (9th Cir. 2000).
48. Brand X Internet Serus., 345 F.3d at 1132 (concluding court bound by precedent established in AT&T Corp.); see also Natl Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n, 125 S. Ct.
at 2698 (discussing AT&T Corp. holding).
49. Nat'l Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n, 125 S.Ct. at 2699; see FCC v. Brand X Internet Servs., 543 U.S. 1018 (2004) (mem.) (granting certiorari).
50. 47 U.S.C. § 151 (2000) (pending legislation S. 1753, 109th Cong. (1st

Sess. 2005)).
51. Id. § 152(a).
52. See United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157, 168 (1968)
(citations omitted).
53. See id. at 167-68 (noting broad authority of FCC). Regarding the FCC's
authority, the Supreme Court in Southwestern Cable stated:
Nothing in the language of § 152(a), in the surrounding language, or in
the Act's history or purposes limits the Commission's authority to those

activities and forms of communication that are specifically described by
the Act's other provisions. The section itself states merely that the "provi-
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The Communications Act of 1934 and Telecommunications Act of
1996

The Communications Act, as amended over time, established
distinct regulatory frameworks for telephone companies and cable
television companies. 54 Title II of the Communications Act set
forth the regulations for telephone companies as common-carriers.5 5 The Communications Act requires, inter alia, common carri-

ers to provide service on a nondiscriminatory basis 5 6 at 'just and
reasonable" rates.

57

Cable companies providing cable services are

sions of [the Act] shall apply to all interstate and foreign communication
by wire or radio * * " Similarly, the legislative history indicates that the
Commission was given "regulatory power over all forms of electrical communication * * *" Certainly Congress could not in 1934 have foreseen
the development of community antenna television systems, but it seems
to us that it was precisely because Congress wished "to maintain, through
appropriate administrative control, a grip on the dynamic aspects of radio transmission," that it conferred upon the Commission a "unified jurisdiction" and "broad authority." Thus, "[u]nderlying the whole
[Communications Act] is recognition of the rapidly fluctuating factors
characteristic of the evolution of broadcasting and of the corresponding
requirement that the administrative process possess sufficient flexibility
to adjust itself to these factors." Congress in 1934 acted in a field that was
demonstrably "both new and dynamic," and it therefore gave the Commission "a comprehensive mandate," with ".... expansive powers. We have

found no reason to believe that § 152 does not, as its terms suggest, confer regulatory authority over "all interstate * * * communication by wire
or radio."
Id. at 172-73 (penultimate ellipsis added) (citations omitted).
54. For a general discussion of the difference between regulation of telephone companies and cable companies, see infra notes 55-59 and accompanying
text.
55. See Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, Title II, 48 Stat. 1064, 1070-81
(1934) (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. §§ 201-231 (2000)) (providing regulations for "common carriers"); see also 47 U.S.C. § 153(10) (2000) ("'[C]ommon
carrier' or 'carrier' means any person engaged as a common carrier for hire, in
interstate or foreign communication by wire or radio.., except where reference is
made to common carriers not subject to this chapter ....
).
56. See 47 U.S.C. § 202(a) (2000) (detailing requirements). Section 202(a)
provides:
It shall be unlawful for any common carrier to make any unjust or
unreasonable discrimination in charges, practices, classifications, regulations, facilities, or services for or in connection with like communication
service, directly or indirectly, by any means or device, or to make or give
any undue or unreasonable preference or advantage to any particular
person, class of persons, or locality, or to subject any particular person,
class of persons, or locality to any undue or unreasonable prejudice or
disadvantage.
Id.
57. See 47 U.S.C. § 201(b) (2000). The relevant text of this section reads:
"[a]ll charges, practices, classifications, and regulations for and in connection with
such communication service, shall be just and reasonable, and any such charge,
practice, classification, or regulation that is unjust or unreasonable is declared to
be unlawful. . .

."

Id.
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regulated under Title VI of the Communications Act as established
by the Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984.58 Further, cable
operators providing cable service are explicitly exempted from
5
common-carrier regulations.

9

In 1996, Congress passed the Telecommunications Act of 1996
"through which it sought to provide a '.. . framework' designed to
promote the 'deployment of advanced telecommunications and information technologies to all Americans by opening up all telecommunications markets to competition.'- 60 The 1996 Act maintained
the existing "common carrier obligations on providers of 'telecommunications services' but left providers of 'information services'
61
subject to much less stringent regulation."
The Communications Act, as amended, "does not clearly indicate how cable modem service should be classified or regulated
....

"62

The 1996 Act defines "telecommunications service" as "the

offering of telecommunications for a fee directly to the public, or to
such classes of users as to be effectively available directly to the public, regardless of the facilities used." 63 It defines "telecommunications" as "the transmission, between or among points specified by
58. See Cable Communications and Policy Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-549, 98
Stat. 2779, 2780 (1984) (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. §§ 521-522, 531-537,
541-549, 551-561 (2000)) (establishing, inter alia, policies and regulations for cable
communications).
59. See 47 U.S.C. § 541(c) (2000) (pending legislation H.R. 2726, 109th Cong.
(1st Sess. 2005)) (providing cable companies "shall not be subject to regulation as
a common-carrier or utility by reason of providing any cable service"). "Cable service" is defined as "(A) the one-way transmission to subscribers of (i) video programming, or (ii) other programming service, and (B) subscriber interaction, if
any, which is required for the selection of use of such video programming or other
programming service." Id. § 522(6) (A),(B). "Video Programming" is defined to
mean "programming provided by, or generally considered comparable to programming provided by, a television broadcast station." Id. § 522(20). "[T]he term
'other programming service' means information that a cable operator makes available to all subscribers generally." Id. § 522(14).
60. Brand X Internet Servs. v. FCC, 345 F.3d 1120, 1125 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting H.R. REP. No. 104-458, at 113 (1996) (Conf. Rep.)).
61. Id.; see Nat'l Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 125 S.
Ct. 2688, 2696 (2005) (noting FCC can use its Title I ancillary jurisdiction to impose additional regulatory obligations on information service providers). While
"information service" providers are not regulated under Title II, the FCC has jurisdiction to regulate such services using its Title I authority. See Nat'l Cable &
Telecomms. Ass'n, 125 S. Ct. at 2696.
62. Declaratory Ruling, 17 F.C.C.R. 4798, 4819
32 (2002) (describing complexity in classifying cable modem service). In fact, in the Declaratory Ruling, the
FCC noted that parties advocated for "several different legal classifications," including " ' cable service,' 'information service,' . . . a combination of 'telecommunications service' and information service, and 'advanced telecommunications
capability."' Id. at 4819 31 (citations omitted).
63. 47 U.S.C. § 153(46) (2000).
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the user, of information of the user's choosing, without change in
the form or content of the information as sent and received. '64 "Information service" is defined as "the offering of a capability for generating, acquiring, storing, transforming, processing, retrieving,
utilizing, or making available information via telecommunications
....

"65

The regulation of cable modem service turns on these

definitions.
iii.

66

The FCC's Response to Cable Modem Service

Opting to take a "hands off" approach, the FCC did not immediately categorize cable modem Internet service for regulatory purposes. 6 7 Pursuant to section 706 of the 1996 Act, however, the FCC
engaged in several inquiries regarding the deployment of advanced
telecommunications capability. 68 Following the first of these inquiries, the FCC concluded that "[a] t such an early stage of deployment to residential customers, it is difficult to reach any firm
judgment. Nevertheless . . . the deployment of advanced telecom-

munications capability to all Americans appears, at present, to be
proceeding on a reasonable and timely schedule." 69 The FCC conceded it based its conclusion on a "static snapshot taken at the pre64. Id. § 153(43).

65. Id. § 153(20).
66. See DeclaratoryRuling, 17 F.C.C.R. at 4820 34 (listing definitions of "telecommunications service," "telecommunications," and "information service" as "relevant statutory definitions").
67. See Notice of Inquiry, 15 F.C.C.R. 19287, 19288 4 (2000) (noting FCC's
previous "hands off" approach to high-speed services offered by cable operators).
The FCC premised its regulatory restraint "in part, on the belief that 'multiple
methods of increasing bandwidth are or soon will be made available to a broad
range of customers.'" Id. (citation omitted).
68. See Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, Title VII,
§ 706(b), 110 Stat. 56, 153 (1996), reprinted in 47 U.S.C. § 157 notes at 121 (West
2000) (obligating FCC to inquire into availability of advanced telecommunications
capability). Section 706(b), tided "Inquiry," obligates the FCC to regularly "initiate a notice of inquiry concerning the availability of advanced telecommunications
capability to all Americans ...." Id. Further, section 706(b) requires the FCC to
take immediate action if it concludes that advanced telecommunications services
are not "being deployed to all Americans in a reasonable and timely fashion." Id.
69. In the Matter of Inquiry Concerning the Deployment of Advanced
Telecomms. Capability to All Ars. in a Reasonable and Timely Fashion, and Possible Steps to Accelerate Such Deployment Pursuant to Section 706 of the
Telecomms. Act of 1996, 14 F.C.C.R. 2398, 2446 91 (1999) [hereinafter First 706
Inquiry]. The FCC reached its conclusion by comparing advanced telecommunications deployment to previous deployments of original telephone, "over-the-air"
black and white television, color television, and cellular service. See id. (referencing 1 31-32 where FCC indicated it would use previous deployments of original
telephone, "over-the-air" black and white television, color television, and cellular
service as models against which to compare deployment of broadband Internet
access to residential consumers). The FCC noted that:
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sent moment," and would, therefore, take measures to ensure
reasonable and timely deployment as the market develops.70 After
a second inquiry, the FCC again determined that, on the whole,
deployment of advanced telecommunications capability to all
v
Americans was proceeding in a "reasonable and timely fashion."'
Following the second inquiry, the FCC decided to address the regulatory classification of cable modem service and issued the Notice of
Inquiry.72 In the Notice of Inquiry, the FCC sought comment on

whether it should classify "cable modem service and/or the cable
modem platform as a cable service subject to Title VI; as a telecommunications service under Title II; as an information service subject
to Title I; or some entirely different or hybrid service subject to
73
multiple provisions of the [Communications] Act."
375,000 residential [broadband] customers, or .4% residential penetration, at the end of the second calendar year of deployment is far more
than the number of customers for the telephone, color television, and
cellular service at the same stage in their deployment, and approximately
the same penetration percentage as that of black-and-white television.
Id. at 2447 1 92.
70. Id. at 2447 1 93 (explaining limitation of analysis and "[e]nsuring that
deployment is reasonable and timely as the market develops continues to be one of
[the FCC's] top priorities"). The FCC indicated that it would:
[E]xamine barriers to entry to determine whether such barriers inhibit
firms' ability to meet customer demand. Where immediate action is warranted, we are taking steps ... to ensure that the deployment of broadband is reasonable and timely. We will also continue to monitor closely
the deployment of broadband to all Americans, most specifically in future
reports of this type.
Id.
71. In the Matter of Inquiry Concerning the Deployment of Advanced Telecommunications Capability to all Ams. in a Reasonable and Timely Fashion, and
Possible Steps to Accelerate Such Deployment Pursuant to Section 706 of the
Telecomms. Act of 1996, 15 F.C.C.R. 20913, 20914 1 1 (2000) [hereinafter Second
706 Inquiry] (concluding deployment proceeding in reasonable and timely fashion despite uneven deployment).
72. See Notice of Inquiry, 15 F.C.C.R. at 19287-89 11 2, 4 (indicating purpose of
inquiry to seek comment on whether "hands-off" approach remains correct policy
and how FCC should introduce national policy framework for high-speed services).
The FCC's motivation to determine the appropriate regulatory classification of
cable modem service was due in part to several federal court opinions which classified cable modem service in different ways. See Brand X Internet Servs. v. FCC, 345
F.3d 1120, 1125-26 (9th Cir. 2003) (discussing FCC's Notice of Inquiry).
73. Notice of Inquiry, 15 F.C.C.R. at 19293 1 15. "Cable service" is defined as,
"(A) the one-way transmission to subscribers of (i) video programming, or (ii)
other programming service, and (B) subscriber interaction, if any, which is required for the selection or use of such video programming or other programming
service." 47 U.S.C. § 522(6) (2000). "Telecommunications service" is defined as
"the offering of telecommunications for a fee directly to the public, or to such
classes of users as to be effectively available directly to the public, regardless of the
facilities used." Id. § 153(46). Lastly, "information service" is defined as:
[T]he offering of a capability for generating, acquiring, storing, transforming, processing, retrieving, utilizing, or making available information
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On March 15, 2002, the FCC issued its Declaratory Ruling and
notice of proposed rulemaking. 74 In the DeclaratoryRuling, the FCC
classified cable modem service solely as an "interstate information
service" and further clarified that cable modem service was neither
a cable service nor a telecommunications service. 75 By classifying
cable modem service as information service, the FCC precluded the
mandatory application of the common carrier requirements imposed under Title II of the Communications Act. 76 The FCC first

looked to the statutory definitions of "telecommunications service"
and "information service," which it concluded were based on the
77
nature of the service offered to consumers.
For guidance with classifying cable modem service, the FCC
looked to an earlier decision, the Universal Service Report,78 in which
the agency classified Internet access service as an information service. 79 In light of the FCC's conclusion in the Universal Service Revia telecommunications, and includes electronic publishing, but does not
include any use of any such capability for the management, control, or
operation of a telecommunications system or the management of a telecommunications service.
Id. § 153(20).
74. See DeclaratoryRuling, 17 F.C.C.R. 4798, 4798 (2002) (listing release date).
75. See id. at 4802 7 (stating FCC's conclusion); Steven Aronowitz, Brand X
Internet Services v. FCC: The Case of the Missing Policy Argument, 20 BERKELEY TECH.
L.J. 887, 893-94 (2005) (discussing FCC's Declaratory Ruling). For definitions of
"cable service" and "telecommunications service," see supra notes 59, 63, and accompanying text. The FCC identified three core principles that they wanted to
uphold during their consideration: to provide broadband Internet access to all
Americans; minimize regulatory interference in the market and "remove regulatory uncertainty that... may discourage investment and innovation"; and "create a
rational framework for the regulation of competing services" which utilize differ4-6 (explaining
ent platforms. See Declaratory Ruling, 17 F.C.C.R. at 4801-02
principles guiding FCC's consideration of proper regulation of cable modem
service).
76. See Nat'l Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 125 S. Ct.
2688, 2697 (2005) (indicating cable modem service is not subject to Title II common carrier obligations because it is classified as information service and not telecommunications service which is subject to Title II obligations).
34-35 ("None of the fore77. See DeclaratoryRuling, 17 F.C.C.R. at 4820-211
going statutory definitions rests on the particular types of facilities used. Rather,
each rests on the function that is made available.").
78. In the Matter of Fed.-StateJoint Bd. on Universal Serv., 13 F.C.C.R. 11501
(1998) [hereinafter Universal Service Report]. The purpose of the Universal Service
Report was to advise Congress about the "implementation of certain provisions of
the 1996 Act concerning the universal service system. It focused in part on the
relationship between universal service and the explosive growth of Internet-based
information services. The report specifically reserved the question of the statutory
classification of cable modem service." DeclaratoryRuling, 17 F.C.C.R. at 4821 36
n.141 (citing Universal Service Report, 13 F.C.C.R. 11501, 11535 n.140 (1998)).
36 (noting FCC findings in
79. See Declaratory Ruling, 17 F.C.C.R. at 4821
Universal Service Report). In the Universal Service Report the FCC explained that Internet access service is an information service because the provider "offers a single,

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/mslj/vol13/iss2/4

14

2006]

Manni: National Cable & Telecommunications Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Ser
BRAND X: A WAR OF WORDS

port, the FCC adopted the "end user" analysis and ruled that cable
modem service, like Internet access service, is a single integrated
service offering use of the Internet.8 0 The FCC found that, even
though the cable operator provides cable modem service over its
own facilities, it "is not offering telecommunications service to the
end user, but rather is merely using telecommunications to provide
end users with cable modem service."8 1
The FCC explicitly rejected the idea that cable modem service
offers a separate telecommunications service for purposes of regulation under the Communications Act.8 2 Instead, as noted above, the
FCC determined that cable modem service is provided purely via
telecommunications and that the end user is not offered telecommunications services separate from Internet access.8 3 Important to
integrated service, Internet access, to the subscriber." Id. (explaining FCC reasoning in UniversalService Report for concluding Internet access service is information
service). The FCC noted further that the single integrated service combines several components which enabled end users (consumers) "to run a variety of applications," which should not be considered as separate services with separate legal
status. See id. (footnote omitted) (acknowledging that Internet access "combines
computer processing, information provision, and computer interactivity with data
transport").
80. See id. at 4822 1 38 ("Consistent with the analysis in the Universal Service
Report, we conclude that the classification of cable modem service turns on the
nature of the functions that the end user is offered."). Based on the end user
analysis, the agency stated specifically that, "[a]s currently provisioned, cable
modem service is a single, integrated service that enables the subscriber to utilize
Internet access service through a cable provider's facilities and to realize the benefits of a comprehensive service offering." Id. at 4823 38.
81. Id. at 4824
41 (footnote omitted) (concluding fact that cable modem
service is provided over cable operators' own facilities is not enough, by itself, for
FCC to conclude cable operators are offering telecommunications service to end
users). The FCC found support for this distinction in the Universal Service Report,
stating "[i]n the Universal Service Report, the [FCC] concluded that the Act's 'information service' and 'telecommunications service' definitions establish mutually exclusive categories of service . . . ." Id. at 4823 1 41. In the Universal Service Report,
the FCC stated "when an entity offers transmission incorporating the 'capability for
generating, acquiring, storing, transforming, processing, retrieving, utilizing, or
making available information' . .. it offers an 'information service' even though it
uses telecommunications to do so." Universal Service Report, 13 F.C.C.R. at 11520
39.
82. See Declaratory Ruling, 17 F.C.C.R. at 4823 1 39 ("Cable modem service is
not itself and does not include an offering of telecommunications service to
subscribers.").
83. See id. (noting cable modem service provides its service via telecommunications, which is inseparable from that service). The FCC notes that its conclusion
is "[c]onsistent with the statutory definition of 'information service' [because]
cable modem service provides [its] capabilities. . . 'via telecommunications.'" Id.
(citing 47 U.S.C. § 153(20)). For the definition of "information service," see supra
notes 65, 73, and accompanying text. The FCC stresses that "the Act distinguishes
'telecommunications' from 'telecommunications service'" and that they have already recognized that all information service providers require the use of telecommunications to provide a connection for their customers. See DeclaratoryRuling, 17
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this determination is the FCC's finding that " [w] e are not aware of
any cable modem service provider that has made a stand-alone offering of transmission for a fee directly to the public, or to such
'84
classes of users as to be effectively available directly to the public.
Further, the FCC rejected the contention that it should require
cable modem service providers to create a stand-alone transmission
service and offer it to ISPs.85 The FCC responded that it has ap-

plied such a requirement exclusively to traditional wireline services
and facilities like telephone companies.8 6 The FCC stated they
never applied such a requirement to information services provided
over cable facilities and that they will not extend any such requirement.8 7 Even in circumstances where cable modem providers also
F.C.C.R. at 4823, 40 (explaining distinction between "telecommunications" and
"telecommunications service"). It is noted that while the transmission of information between the information service provider and their customers may be "'telecommunications,'" that transmission is not necessarily a separate
'telecommunications service.'" Id. For the definition of "telecommunications,"
see supra note 64 and accompanying text. For the definition of "telecommunications service," see supra note 63 and accompanying text.
84. DeclaratoryRuling, 17 F.C.C.R. at 4823 40 (referencing Communications
Act, 47 U.S.C. § 153(46)) (explaining FCC is not aware of stand-alone offering of
transmission and that they do not require such offering). This fact distinguishes
cable modem service providers from common carriers who are subject to Title II
obligations. See id. at 4825 43 (noting traditional common carriers provide telecommunications service separate from their information service offering). Further, the FCC concluded that, even in instances where a cable modem service
provider offers multiple ISPs, "the offering would be a private carrier service and
not a common carrier service, because the record indicates that [the cable operator] determines on an individual basis whether to deal with particular ISPs and on
what terms to do so." Id. at 4830 54 (citations omitted).
85. See id. at 4824-25
42-43 (discussing and rejecting commentator
EarthLink's contention that cable modem service providers should be required to
.create a stand-alone transmission service and offer it to ISPs and other information service providers... pursuant to the [C] omputer11requirements"). Generally,
Computer II was part of "the [FCC's] develop [ment] [of] rules to regulate dataprocessing services offered over telephone wires." Nat'l Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n
v. Brand X Internet Servs., 125 S. Ct. 2688, 2696 (2005). The "'Computer II'rules
distinguished between 'basic' service (like telephone service) and 'enhanced' service (computer-processing service offered over telephone lines)," and defined
both by reference to how the consumer viewed the offered service. Id. at 2996-97
(describing origins of statutory classifications "telecommunications carrier" and
"information service providers"). "Basic service" and "enhanced service" are the
historical counterparts to "telecommunications service" and "information service."
See id. at 2697 (describing "telecommunications service" as analog to "basic service"
and "information service" as analog to "enhanced service"). For more information
about the Computer II regime, see generally In the Matter of Amendment of Section 64.702 of the Commission's Rules and Regulations (Second Computer Inquiry), Final Decision, 77 F.C.C.2d 384 (1980).
86. See DeclaratoryRuling, 17 F.C.C.R. at 4825 43 (discussing Computer II requirements in context of cable modem service).
87. See id. (declining to extend Computer I1). The FCC remarked that "[commentators] invite[ ] us, in essence, to find a telecommunications service inside
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offer telephone service which is traditionally a "telecommunications
service" subject to Title II, the FCC noted it would waive the unbundling requirement to prevent uneven application to the limited
cable modem providers who also offer telephone service, thereby
encouraging cable companies to continue participating in the telephone service market.8 8
iv.

Circuit Inconsistency

Prior to the FCC issuing the Declaratory Ruling, courts treated
cable modem service and Internet service inconsistently. 89 Part of
the reason for this inconsistency was that the Communications Act,
as amended, "does not deal [w]ith the Internet [or Internet access]
in specific terms."90 In 2000, several circuits decided cases that provide examples of the different treatment given to cable modem service and Internet access provided by cable modem service. 91
In Gulf Power Co. v. FCC,9 2 the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that "the 1996 Act does not authorize the FCC to reguevery information service, extract it, and make it a stand-alone offering to be regulated under Title II of the Act. Such radical surgery is not required." Id.
88. See id. at 4825-26
45-47 (discussing application of unbundling requirements to cable modem service providers who also offer telephone service). The
FCC has "discretion to waive [a] requirement[ ] ... where the particular facts
would make strict compliance inconsistent with the public interest." Id. at 4826
45 (noting FCC may waive requirements if good cause is shown). In the context of
cable operators, the FCC believes that requiring cable operators who offer telephone service in addition to cable modem service to unbundle their services would
provide an incentive for those cable companies to stop offering telephone service.
See id. at 4826 47 (indicating that this result "would undermine the long-delayed
hope of creating facilities based competition in the telephony marketplace and
thereby seriously undermine the goal of the 1996 Act to open all telecommunications markets to competition"). Further, the FCC concluded that applying the
Computer II regulations would also undermine the goals of Section 706 to facilitate
the deployment of advanced telecommunications capability in a reasonable and
timely fashion. See id. (explaining why FCC would waive Computer II in circumstances where cable operator also offers local exchange service).
89. For a discussion of this inconsistent treatment, see infra notes 92-129 and
accompanying text.
90. Christopher E. Duffy, Note, The Statutory Classificationof Cable-DeliveredInternet Service, 100 COLUM. L. REv. 1251, 1263 (2000) (asserting that, with lack of
specific provisions related to Internet, "information service" is most suitable classification for cable modem service).
91. For a discussion of these cases, see infra notes 92-129 and accompanying
text.
92. 208 F.3d 1263, 1266 (11th Cir. 2000) (reviewing, inter alia, FCC's authority to regulate pole attachments for Internet service under 1996 Act), rev'd sub nom.
Nat'l Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n v. Gulf Power Co., 534 U.S. at 327 (2002).
Though Gulf Power Co. was reversed on appeal, the Supreme Court did not base its
holding on the classification of Internet service, instead, it focused on who attached the cable to the pole. See Nat'l Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n v. Gulf Power
Co., 534 U.S. 327, 336-37 (2002) (declining to decide correct categorization of
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late pole attachments for Internet service." 93 In the 1996 Act,
Congress authorized the FCC to establish a rent structure applicable to cable or telecommunications service providers who attach
94
their cables to poles owned by power and telephone companies.
The 1996 Act only authorized rent structures for attachments providing cable or telecommunications services. 95 Therefore, "[f] or
the FCC to be able to regulate the rent for an attachment that provides Internet service then, Internet service must qualify as either a
cable service or a telecommunications service." 96
Finding the FCC lacked authority over Internet service pole attachments, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that Internet service
does not meet the definition of a "cable service.

'9 7

First, Internet

service is outside the scope of what Congress intended "cable serInternet services). Indeed, the Supreme Court reversed the Eleventh Circuit, stating that the provisions requiring the FCC to regulate the rates, terms, and conditions for pole attachments, which include any attachment by a cable television
system, resolve the issue. See id. at 333 (addressing whether Communications Act
applies to attachments providing high-speed Internet access commingled with
cable television). The Supreme Court stated:
No one disputes that a cable attached by a cable television company,
which provides only cable television service, is an attachment "by a cable
television system." If one day its cable provides high-speed Internet access, in addition to cable television service, the cable does not cease, at
that instant, to be an attachment "by a cable television system." The addition of a service does not change the character of the attaching entity the entity the attachment is "by."
Id.
93. Gulf Power Co., 208 F.3d at 1278 (concluding Internet service does not
satisfy the statutory definition of either "telecommunications service" or "cable
service").
94. See id. at 1276 (discussing regulation of rates for cable and telecommunications pole attachments).
95. See id. (discussing fee structures for pole attachments). The court in Gulf
Power Co. noted that the 1996 Act requires the FCC to "establish two rates for pole
attachments." Id. (describing pole attachment rates under 1996 Act). One rate
applies to "any pole attachment used by a cable television system solely to provide
cable service." 47 U.S.C. § 224(d) (3) (2000). The other applies to "charges for
pole attachments used by telecommunications carriers to provide telecommunications services .

. . ."

Id. § 224(e)(1).

96. Gulf Power Co., 208 F.3d at 1276. The Eleventh Circuit also stated that its
interpretation of the 1996 Act led it to believe that only services which are purely
cable service or telecommunications service trigger the rent scheme. See id. at
1276 n.29 ("The straightforward language of subsections (d) and (e) of [section
224 of the 1996 Act] directs the FCC to establish two specific just and reasonable
rates, one for cable television systems providing solely cable service and one for
telecommunications carriers providing telecommunications service; no other rates
are authorized.").
97. See id. at 1276 ("The 1996 Act allows the [FCC] to regulate the rates for
cable service and telecommunications service; Internet service is neither.").
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vice" to cover. 98 Second, the FCC previously determined that Internet service was an information service. 99 Additionally, the court
concluded that Internet service was not a "telecommunications service" and cited the FCC's conclusion in its Universal Service Report
that Internet service does not meet the definition of "telecommunications service." 10 0
In contrast, the Fourth Circuit in MediaOne Group, Inc. v.
County of Henrico0 1 affirmed an Eastern District of Virginia opinion,
which invalidated a local ordinance that imposed open access requirements on cable modem service as a condition to approval of a
franchise transfer. 10 2 In affirming the district court, the Fourth Circuit implicitly concluded that cable modem service involved a telecommunications component. 10 3 In effect, the Fourth Circuit's
analysis suggested that cable modem service is a composite service
consisting of several individual components. 10 4 The court concluded that the cable modem platform by itself fit the definition of
"telecommunications."1' 0 5 Ultimately, the Fourth Circuit held that
the Communications Act preempted and superceded the local ordinance because its open access requirement was inconsistent with
10 6
the Communications Act.
In contrast with both the Fourth and Eleventh Circuits is the
Ninth Circuit's treatment of cable modem service in Brand X In98. See id. at 1276-77 (illustrating difference between definition of "cable service" in 1978 legislation and 1996 Act and concluding that Congress did not intend
scope of "cable service" definition to include services beyond traditional video
base, which encompasses traditional video programming).
99. See id. at 1277 (noting FCC defined Internet service as information service
in Universal Service Report).
100. See id. at 1277-78 (rejecting defining Internet service as telecommunications service for purposes of pole attachment rent).
101. 257 F.3d 356 (4th Cir. 2001), aftg97 F. Supp. 2d 712 (E.D. Va. 2000)
(mem. opinion).
102. See id. at 359 (describing factual background to dispute).
103. See id. ("Henrico County's open access provision violates the federal [sic]
Communications Act by forcing MediaOne to provide its telecommunication facilities (its cable modem platform) to any ISP as a condition for the County's approval
of the transfer of control of the franchise." (citations omitted)).
104. See id. at 363 (illustrating that "cable modem platform, separated from its
Internet service component, is a telecommunications facility because it is a pipeline for telecommunications, that is, for 'the transmission.., of information of the
user's choosing, without change in the form or content'" (ellipsis in original)
(quoting 47 U.S.C. § 153(43)).
105. See id. at 364 (concluding that MediaOne's cable platform, separated
from its Internet service component, is telecommunications because it fits within
its statutory definition). For the definition of "telecommunications," see supra
note 64 and accompanying text.
106. See MediaOne Group, 257 F.3d at 365 (concluding that Communications
Act preempts and supercedes local ordinance).
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ternet Services v. FCC1 0 7 In this case, the Ninth Circuit decided
whether its prior interpretation of the Communications Act controlled its review of the FCC's DeclaratoryRuling regarding the classification of cable modem service.10 8 The prior interpretation had
occurred three years before in AT&T Corp. v. City of Portland.10 9
The dispute in AT&T Corp. grew out of the merger of AT&T
with Telecommunications, Inc. ("TCI"). 110 The City of Portland attempted to base its approval of the merger on the condition that
AT&T provide open access to ISPs over its broadband cables in
Portland.1 1 1 AT&T offered cable modem Internet access as part of
112
its @Home service.
In determining whether the City of Portland could condition
AT&T's cable service provision upon opening access to its cable
broadband network, the Ninth Circuit evaluated how the Communications Act characterized the @Home service. 113 As part of its
analysis, the court made a distinction between the individual component activities of cable modem service. 114 The court found that
107. 345 F.3d 1120 (9th Cir. 2003), rev'd sub nom. Nat'l Cable & Telecomms.
Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 125 S. Ct. 2688 (2005).
108. See id. at 1123 ("We must decide whether our prior interpretation of the
Telecommunications Act controls review of the [FCC's] decision to classify Internet service provided by cable companies exclusively as an interstate 'information service."').
109. See 216 F.3d 871,873 (9th Cir. 2000) (determining "whether a local cable
franchising authority may condition a transfer of a cable franchise upon the cable
operator's grant of unrestricted access to its cable broadband transmission facilities for Internet service providers other than the operator's proprietary service").
110. See id. at 874 (describing factual foundation of dispute). At the time,
AT&T was the "nation's largest long distance telephone provider," and TCI was
"one of the nation's largest cable television operators." Id. at 874 (describing companies). TCI operated in Portland and provided both traditional cable programming service and cable broadband internet access to its customers. See id. at 874-75
(describing TCI).
111. See id. at 875 (noting that intergovernmental agency recommended that
Portland "approve the transfer of franchise control subject to an open access requirement"). As the local franchising authority, the City of Portland has approval
power over sales of cable systems. See 47 U.S.C. § 537 (2000) (providing 120 day
limit for franchising authority to approve sale or transfer of cable franchise). TCI's
franchise agreement with Portland permitted the City of Portland to place certain
conditions on any transfer of its cable system. See AT&T Corp., 216 F.3d at 875
(quoting language of agreement between City of Portland and TCI).
112. See AT&T Corp., 216 F.3d at 874 (describing @Home service and its offerings). AT&T's @Home service "bundles its cable conduit with Excite, an... [ISP]
under an exclusive contract." Id. Additionally, @Home provides the ISPs' Internet
access service with email accounts, a web site, search capabilities, and other proprietary content. See id. (describing relationship between @Home and Internet
access).
113. See id. at 877-78 (analyzing @Home service under Communications Act).
114. See id. at 878 (discussing statutory treatment of @Home's Internet service
components under Communications Act).
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AT&T's broadband Internet access via @Home (its cable modem
service) consisted of both a pipeline and the Internet access transmitted through the pipeline. 1 15 The court concluded that the Internet access component was an "information service" and the
pipeline component was a "telecommunications service." 11 6 Thus,
the Ninth Circuit held that cable modem service was both an information and telecommunications service. 1 17 Based on these classifications, the court decided that the Communications Act prohibits
local franchising authorities from regulating cable modem service
because the transmission of Internet service over cable broadband
facilities is a "telecommunications service" and was therefore
outside the scope of their local authority. 118
115. See id. (noting that "@Home controls all of the transmission facilities between its subscribers and the Internet" and that @Home functions as both ISP and
telecommunications service provider).
116. See id. at 877-78 (discussing statutory classification of ISP offering Internet access and hardware connection providing data transmission).
117. See AT&T Corp., 216 F.3d at 878 ("To the extent [AT&T's broadband
cable service] @Home is a conventional ISP, its activities are that of an information
service.... [T]o the extent that @Home provides its subscribers Internet transmission over its cable broadband facility, it is providing telecommunications service as
defined in the Communications Act."). Additionally, the court determined that
@Home was not a cable service as defined in the Communications Act. See id. at
876.
118. See id. at 880 (stating holding). Section 541 of the Communications Act
gives local franchising authorities regulatory power over cable services, not telecommunications service. See id. at 878 ("Subsection 541(b) (3) expresses both an
awareness that cable operators could provide telecommunications services, and an
intention that those telecommunications services be regulated as such, rather than
as cable services."). Section 541 (b) (3) reads:
(3) (A) If a cable operator or affiliate thereof is engaged in the provision of telecommunications services(i) such cable operator or affiliate shall not be required to obtain a
franchise under this subchapter for the provision of telecommunications
services; and
(ii) the provisions of this subchapter shall not apply to such cable
operator or affiliate for the provision of telecommunications services.
(B) A franchising authority may not impose any requirement under this
subchapter that has the purpose or effect of prohibiting, limiting, restricting, or conditioning the provision of a telecommunications service by a
cable operator or affiliate thereof.
(C) A franchising authority may not order a cable operator or affiliate
thereof(i) to discontinue the provision of a telecommunications service, or
(ii) to discontinue the operation of a cable system, to the extent such
cable system is used for the provision of a telecommunications service, by
reason of the failure of such cable operator or affiliate thereof to obtain a
franchise or franchise renewal under this subchapter with respect to the
provision of such telecommunications service.
(D) Except as otherwise permitted by sections 531 and 532 of this title a
franchising authority may not require a cable operator to provide any
telecommunications service or facilities, other than institutional net-
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In Brand X Internet Services, the Ninth Circuit held that its prior
interpretation in AT&T Corp. was binding and thus determinative. 119 Therefore, the Ninth Circuit adopted its prior interpretation that cable modem service is both an "information service" and
120
a "telecommunications service."
The Ninth Circuit relied on two cases in determining AT&T
Corp. was binding precedent: Mesa Verde Construction Co. v. Northern
CaliforniaDistrict Council of Laborers,12' a Ninth Circuit case, and Neal
v. United States,122 a Supreme Court case.' 23 The Ninth Circuit rejected the argument that it was not bound by AT&T Corp. because
Mesa Verde allowed the court to favor an agency interpretation if it
was reasonable and consistent with the law.' 24 The Ninth Circuit
replied that "Mesa Verde [ ] clear [ly] mandate [d] that precedent can
be disregarded in favor of a subsequent agency interpretation 'only
where the precedent constituted deferential review of [agency]
decisionmaking." 25 According to the Ninth Circuit, the FCC's argument failed because the FCC had previously declined to address
the issue before the court, so they were not faced with "a case in126
volving potential deference" to an agency interpretation.
works, as a condition of the initial grant of a franchise, a franchise re-

newal, or a transfer of a franchise.
47 U.S.C. § 541 (b) (3) (2000).
119. See Brand X Internet Servs. v. FCC, 345 F.3d 1120, 1132 (9th Cir. 2003)
(concluding that Ninth Circuit and Supreme Court precedent "requires our adherence to the interpretation of the Communications Act we announced in
[AT&T Corp.]"), rev'd sub nom. Nat'l Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 125 S. Ct. 2688 (2005).
120. See id. (adopting prior interpretation of Communications Act as held in
AT&T Corp.). The Ninth Circuit stated: "[In AT&T Corp.], we concluded that

cable broadband service was.., part 'telecommunications service' and part 'information service.'" Id. Thus, the Ninth Circuit vacated the FCC's DeclaratoryRuling

to the extent that its interpretation of the Communications Act conflicted with the
Ninth Circuit's interpretation illustrated in AT&T Corp. See id.
121. 861 F.2d 1124 (9th Cir. 1988), amended and superseded by 895 F.2d 516
(9th Cir. 1989).
122. 516 U.S. 284 (1996).
123. See Brand X Internet Servs., 345 F.3d at 1132 (concluding Mesa Verde and
Neal require adherence to AT&T Corp. precedent).
124. See id. at 1130-31 (discussing Mesa Verde). The FCC argued that AT&T
Corp. was not binding because the Ninth Circuit "did not assert . . . that [the]
construction of the [Communications Act]" was the only plausible reading. Id. at
1131.
125. Id. at 1131 (quoting Mesa Verde, 861 F.2d at 1136).
126. Id. (quoting AT&T Corp., 216 F.3d at 876) (stating in AT&T Corp., Ninth
Circuit did not face dispute involving potential for deference under Chevron,
U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984)). For a discussion of
Chevron, see infra notes 130-36 and accompanying text. The FCC addressed the
AT&T Corp. decision in the Declaratory Ruling. See Declaratory Ruling, 17 F.C.C.R.
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Additionally, the Ninth Circuit interpreted Neal v. United States
as holding that once a court determines a statute's meaning, it becomes the law against which subsequent agency decisions will be
measured. 127 According to the Ninth Circuit's interpretation, they
had the power to authoritatively determine the proper regulatory
classification of cable modem service.1 2 8 Although it set out an important regulatory definition, Brand X relied on precedent and
avoided discussing "the policy implications of classifying cable
modem service as both 'information service' and telecommunica29
tions service."'
B)

Deference to Agency Interpretation, the Chevron Two-Step

In Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, the
Supreme Court created a deferential standard to review an agency's
130
interpretation of a statute within its jurisdiction to administer.
56-58 (2002) (interpreting scope of issue in AT&T Corp. in con4798, 4831-32
text of FCC's classification of cable modem service). The FCC stated:
While we are considering the broad issue of the appropriate national
framework for the regulation of cable modem service, the ... [AT&T
Corp.] court considered a much narrower issue - whether a local franchising authority, whose authority was limited to cable service, had the authority to condition its approval of a cable operator's merger on the
operator's grant of multiple ISP access.
Id. at 4831 56. The FCC also noted that the Ninth Circuit's decision was based
on a "less than comprehensive" record because the parties had not briefed the
57. Further, the FCC noted that
regulatory classification issue. See id. at 4831
"It] he Ninth Circuit could have resolved the narrow question before it by finding
58. In Brand X
that cable modem service is not a cable service." Id. at 4831
Internet Servs., the Ninth Circuit responded by rejecting the assertion that it did not
have to reach the regulatory classification of cable modem service in AT&T Corp.;
consequently the discussion of that issue is not dicta. See Brand Xlnternet Servs., 345
F.3d at 1129-30 (asserting their discussion was not dicta because concluding cable
broadband Internet service over cable broadband facilities is telecommunications
service was essential to their holding).
127. See Brand X Internet Servs., 345 F.3d at 1131-32 (interpreting Neal v.
United States, 516 U.S. 284 (1996)).
128. See id. (explaining Ninth Circuit's rationale). The Ninth Circuit
articulated:
Notwithstanding the Supreme Court's use of the term "we," there is nothing to suggest that Neal's rule should apply only when it is the Supreme
Court . . . construing the statute in question, and the Court itself has

never asserted that the power authoritatively to interpret statutes belongs
to it alone.
Id.
129. Aronowitz, supra note 75, at 898; see id. at 900-01 (arguing Brand X Internet Servs. made wise policy choice with no policy analysis).
130. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 84445 (1984) (discussing standard for reviewing agency interpretation of statute it
administers). Chevron addressed a challenge to an Environmental Protection
Agency ("EPA") regulation defining the term "stationary source" as used in the
Clean Air Act with respect to "regulating 'new or modified stationary sources' of
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The Court held that ambiguities within a statute delegate the authority to the agency to fill the statutory gap in a reasonable fashion. 13 1 The Court explained that filling these gaps involves difficult
13 2
policy considerations better suited for agencies than for courts.
A court must engage in a two-step analysis when determining
whether an agency's construction receives deference.13 3 First, the
court must determine whether the statute is ambiguous on the issue
in question. 34 If the statute is ambiguous then the court must deair pollution." Id. at 837. The court determined that the term "stationary source"
was ambiguous because it was unclear if it referred to, for example, a single emitting source like a smoke stack or an entire facility comprised of several emitting
sources. See id. at 859-63 (concluding that statutory language and legislative history
are silent on issue before Court). Applying the deferential standard the Court
establishes, the Supreme Court deferred to the EPA's construction and held that
"the EPA's definition of the term 'source' is a permissible construction of the statute which seeks to accommodate progress in reducing air pollution with economic
growth." Id. at 866.
131. See id. at 843-44 (describing agency authority to interpret and fill gaps in
statutes which it administers). The Supreme Court explained:
"The power of an administrative agency to administer a congressionally
created . . . program necessarily requires the formulation of policy and
the making of rules to fill any gap left, implicitly or explicitly, by Congress." If Congress has explicitly left a gap for the agency to fill, there is
express delegation of authority to the agency to elucidate a specific provision of the statute by regulation. Such legislative regulations are given
controlling weight unless they are arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute. Sometimes the legislative delegation to an agency on
a particular question is implicit rather than explicit. In such a case, a
court may not substitute its own construction of a statutory provision for a
reasonable interpretation made by the administrator of an agency.
Id. (ellipsis in original) (citations omitted).
132. See id. at 865-66 (contrasting appropriateness of courts or agencies making policy choices). Elaborating, the Court stated:
Judges are not experts in the field, and are not part of either political
branch of the Government. Courts must, in some cases, reconcile competing political interests, but not on the basis of judges' personal policy
preferences. In contrast, an agency to which Congress has delegated policy-making responsibilities may, within the limits of that delegation, properly rely upon the incumbent administration's views of wise policy to
inform itsjudgments. While agencies are not directly accountable to the
people, the Chief Executive is, and it is entirely appropriate for this political branch of the Government to make such policy choices - resolving
the competing interests which Congress itself either inadvertently did not
resolve, or intentionally left to be resolved by the agency charged with the
administration of the statute in light of everyday realities.
Id.
133. See id. at 842-43 (stating there is two step analysis to determine whether
deference is given to agency's interpretation of statute it administers).
134. See id. at 842 ("First, always, is the question whether Congress has directly
spoken to the precise question at issue."). The Court notes that after a court concludes the first step "[i]f the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the
matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously
expressed intent of Congress." Id. at 842-43.
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/mslj/vol13/iss2/4
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termine whether the agency's interpretation is a "permissible construction of the statute." 135 As a result, if a statute is ambiguous and
if the administering agency's interpretation is reasonable, Chevron
even
requires a federal court to defer to the agency's construction,
13 6
if the agency's interpretation differs from the court's.
In United States v. Mead Corp., the Supreme Court considered
the limits of deference courts owed to agency interpretations under
Chevron.13 7 The Mead Court concluded that the applicability of
Chevron depended on the scope of authority Congress delegates in
the statute to the administering agency. 138 Accordingly, the Mead
Court held that an agency interpretation of a statute receives Chevron deference when the interpretation is promulgated under congressionally delegated authority to make rules carrying the force of
law. 139 An agency's power to engage in adjudication, notice-andcomment rule-making, or some other indication of a comparable
congressional intent, denotes the delegation of appropriate
140
authority.
135. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 ("[I]f the statute is silent or ambiguous with
respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the agency's
answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute."). According to the
Supreme Court, after the second step, a court may "impose its own construction
on the statute" only "in the absence of an administrative interpretation." Id. at
843.
136. See Nat'l Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 125 S.Ct.
2688, 2699 (2005) (discussing Chevron doctrine). Chevron created a presumption
that the responsible agency would resolve statutory ambiguities, and thus Congress
"desired the agency (rather than the courts) to possess whatever degree of discretion the ambiguity allows." Id. at 2700 (quoting Smiley v. Citibank (S. Dakota)
N.A., 517 U.S. 735, 740-41 (1996)).
137. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 218 (2001) (considering
whether to apply Chevron deference to United States Customs Service tariff classifications). In Mead, the Court declined to extend Chevron deference to a tariff classification ruling by Customs Service. See id. at 231-33 (declining to extend Chevron
deference). The Court reasoned that the Customs Service does not use noticeand-comment rule-making to issue tariff classifications, issues thousands of such
classifications per year from different offices, does not treat the rulings as binding
on third parties, and warns other importers against reliance on these decisions. See
id. (articulating reasoning for not extending Chevron level deference to tariff
classifications).
138. See id. at 227-31 (discussing Congress's delegation of powers to agencies
and indicia of implicit or explicit intent to leave gaps to agency discretion).
139. See id. at 226-27 ("[A] dministrative implementation of a particular statutory provision qualifies for Chevron deference when it appears that Congress delegated authority to the agency generally to make rules carrying the force of law, and
that the agency interpretation claiming deference was promulgated in the exercise
of that authority.").
140. See id. at 229-30 (noting congressional authorization to engage in process
of rulemaking or adjudication is good indicator that deference is merited). The
Court reasoned that it should be apparent from an "agency's generally conferred
authority and other statutory circumstances that Congress would expect the agency

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2006

25

378

Jeffrey S. Moorad Sports Law Journal, Vol. 13, Iss. 2 [2006], Art. 4
JOuRNAL
[Vol. 13: p. 353

VILLANOVA SPORTS & ENT. LAW

Nevertheless, the Mead Court did not strip all deference from
1 41
an agency decision that does not qualify for Chevron deference.
Such an agency decision will receive some deference given that

agencies have specialized experience, access to more comprehensive information, and an "understanding[ ] of what a national law
requires.

' 14 2

These interpretations that "lack the force of law" are

"'entitled to respect' . . . to the extent that those interpretations
have the 'power to persuade.' "1,43
IV.

ANALYSIS

A. Narrative Analysis
In National Cable & Telecommunications Ass'n v. Brand X Internet
Services, the Supreme Court addressed the appropriate regulatory
classification for broadband Internet service under the Communications Act, as amended by the 1996 Act. 144 Specifically, the Court
reviewed the FCC's conclusion that cable modem broadband Internet service provided by cable companies is an information service, as defined by the Communications Act, and therefore not
subject to common-carrier regulations.1 45 The Court held: 1) the
Chevron doctrine applied to their analysis; 2) under Chevron, the
FCC's classification of cable modem broadband Internet service is a
lawful construction of the Communications Act; and 3) the FCC's
to be able to speak with the force of law when it addresses ambiguity in the statute
or fills a space in the enacted law ....
Id. at 229.
141. See id. at 234 (stating tariff classifications do not fall "outside the pale of
any deference whatever its form ....

").

142. Mead, 533 U.S. at 234 (citing Skidmore v. Swift, 323 U.S. 134, 139-40
(1944)) (noting some deference is still merited).
143. Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000) (quoting Skidmore, 332 U.S. at 140). In Christensen, the Supreme Court addressed arguments by
petitioners and the United States that a Department of Labor opinion letter is
entitled to Chevron deference. See id. at 586 (summarizing petitioners' and United
States' contentions). The Court rejected this contention stating "[i]nterpretations
such as those in opinion letters-like interpretations contained in policy statements,
agency manuals, and enforcement guidelines, all of which lack the force of law - do
not warrant Chevron-style deference." Id. at 587.
144. See Nat'l Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 125 S. Ct.
2688, 2696 (2005) (stating issue).
145. See id. at 2697-99 (stating FCC's Declaratory Ruling is under review in this
case); Declaratory Ruling, 17 F.C.C.R. 4798, 4802 7 (2002) ("[W]e conclude that
the cable modem service, as it is currently offered, is properly classified as an interstate information service, not as a cable service, and that there is no separate offering of telecommunications service."). The Communications Act, as amended by
the 1996 Act, imposes common-carrier requirements on telecommunications carriers but not on information service providers. See Nat'l Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n, 125
S. Ct. at 2696. For a discussion of the common-carrier requirements, see supra
notes 55-57 and accompanying text.
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decision to treat cable modem service differently from DSL was not
146
arbitrary or capricious under the Administrative Procedure Act.
Justice Thomas, writing for the majority, first considered
whether the Chevron doctrine should apply to the FCC's interpretation of "telecommunications service." 147 Chevron requires a federal
court to accept the agency's interpretation if a statute is ambiguous
and the administering agency interpretation is permissible under
the statute. 148 The Court concluded that the Chevron doctrine
should govern its review of the FCC's construction. 149 Explaining
that "[a]gency inconsistency is not a basis for declining to analyze
the agency's interpretation under the Chevron framework," the
Court rejected respondents' argument that the Commission's inter150
pretation is inconsistent with past practice.
The Court additionally concluded that the Ninth Circuit erred
when it declined to apply the Chevron doctrine, instead following
Ninth Circuit precedent set forth in AT&T Corp., which interpreted
151
the Communications Act contrary to the FCC's interpretation.
Specifically, the Court held that the Ninth Circuit erred by assuming its construction of the Communications Act in AT&T Corp.
superceded the FCC's, "regardless of whether [AT&T Corp.] had
146. See Nat'l Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n, 125 S. Ct. at 2691, 2710, 2711 (stating
separate holdings).
147. Id. at 2699 (noting first issue addressed).
148. For a discussion of the Chevron doctrine, see supra notes 130-36 and accompanying text.
149. See Nat'l Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n, 125 S. Ct. at 2699 (concluding Chevron
applies to FCC's interpretation even if court disagrees). The Court noted that the
FCC is the agency Congress delegated with the authority to "'execute and enforce'
the Communications Act, § 151, and to 'prescribe such rules and regulations as
may be necessary in the public interest to carry out the provisions' of the Act
§ 201(b)." Id. (citing AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366, 377-78 (1999)).
150. Id. at 2699 ("Unexplained inconsistency is, at most, a reason for holding
an interpretation to be an arbitrary and capricious change from agency practice
under the Administrative Procedure Act."(citing Motor Vehicles Mfrs. Ass'n of
United States, Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 46-57 (1983))).
The Court explained if the agency adequatelyjustifies its reversal of policy "change
is not invalidating since . . . Chevron . . . leave[s] the discretion provided by the

ambiguities of a statute with the implementing agency." Id. at 2699-700 (quoting
Smiley v. Citibank (S. Dakota) N.A., 517 U.S. 735, 742 (1996)).
151. See id. at 2699 (noting Ninth Circuit should have applied Chevron). The
Ninth Circuit vacated the Declaratory Ruling to the extent it concluded that cable
modem service was not a "telecommunications service" under the Communications Act. See Brand X Internet Servs. v. FCC, 345 F.3d 1120, 1132 (9th Cir. 2003)
(acknowledging Mesa Verde and Neal "requires our adherence" to AT&T Corp. 's
understanding of Communications Act), rev'd sub nom. Nat'l Cable Telecomms.
Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 125 S. Ct. 2688 (2005). In AT&T Corp., the Ninth
Circuit held that "cable broadband service was not a 'cable service' but instead was
part 'telecommunications service' and part 'information service.'" Id.
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held the statute to be unambiguous." 5 2 The Supreme Court explained that a "court's prior judicial construction of a statute
trumps an agency construction otherwise entitled to Chevron deference only if the prior court decision holds that its construction follows from the unambiguous terms of the statute and thus leaves no
room for agency discretion."1 53 According to the Court, the Ninth
Circuit incorrectly interpreted Neal v. United States as establishing
that a "prior judicial construction of a statute" trumps "an agency's
contrary construction." 154 The Ninth Circuit's incorrect interpretation of Neal caused it to rely on its prior interpretation of the term
"telecommunications service" in AT&T Corp., instead of applying
1 55
Chevron.
Once the Court established that the Chevron doctrine was the
proper standard of review, it addressed whether the FCC's construction of the definition of "telecommunications service" is a permissible reading of the Communications Act under Chevron.156 The
152. Nat'l Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n, 125 S. Ct. at 2700 (noting Ninth Circuit's
reasoning was incorrect).
153. Id. According to the Court, Chevron established a presumption that Congress wanted agencies to initially resolve statutory ambiguities, and intended for
agencies to possess "whatever degree of discretion the ambiguity allows." Id. (quoting Smiley, 517 U.S. at 740-41). Further, the Court reasoned that allowing judicial
precedent that did not hold the statute was unambiguous to "foreclose" an agency
interpretation violates Chevron. See id. The Court explained that such a rule would
result in a system where the determination whether an agency's interpretation of
an ambiguous statute is entitled to Chevron deference would depend on whose
interpretation came first. See id. This result conflicts with the delegation of agency
authority because an agency's authority to interpret a statute "does not depend on
the order in which the judicial and administrative constructions occur." Id.
The dissent argued, however, that allowing an agency to override what a court
believes is the best interpretation leaves judicial decisions susceptible to reversal by
executive officers. See id. at 2719 (Scalia, J., dissenting). The majority responded
by asserting that an agency's decision to interpret an ambiguous statute differently
from a court does not render the court's holding legally wrong. See id. at 2701
(adding that court's opinion as to best statutory interpretation is not binding). An
agency has congressionally delegated authority to interpret the statutes it administers, therefore, agencies may choose different constructions. See id.
154. Id. at 2701 (indicating Neal established only that contrary agency construction is foreclosed only by judicial precedent holding statute to be
unambiguous).
155. See id. (explaining Ninth Circuit's misinterpretation of Neal resulted in
misplaced reliance on Ninth Circuit precedent). The Ninth Circuit's mistaken assumption led them to conclude that the interpretation of telecommunications service in AT&T Corp. controlled. See id. However, AT&T Corp. held only that their
interpretation was the best interpretation, not the only permissible interpretation.
See id.
156. See id. at 2702-04 (analyzing FCC's interpretation of "telecommunications service"). The Court engaged in this analysis despite noting "it is not logically necessary for us to reach the question whether the Court of Appeals
misapplied Chevron for us to decide whether the [FCC] acted lawfully." Id. at 2702.
The Court feared that upholding the DeclaratoryRuling"without reaching the Chev-
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Court ultimately concluded that the Communications Act is ambiguous concerning the definition of "telecommunications service"
and that the FCC's interpretation represents a permissible reading
157
of the Communications Act.

The Court determined that the Communications Act is ambiguous as to whether cable companies "offer" telecommunications
with cable modem service. 15 8 The Court concluded that the term
"offer," as used in the definition of "telecommunications service," is
ambiguous because it has two reasonable usages.1 59 One interpretation is that cable companies offer consumers an "information service" via telecommunications; the other is that cable companies
"offer" high-speed data transmission as a "stand-alone" input used
to provide the information service. 160 The Court held that cable
companies providing broadband cable modem service offer finished Internet service delivered via the discrete components composing this end product, which includes telecommunications data
transmission. 161 Because of the integrated nature of Internet service and its components, they "need not be described as distinct
ron point" would allow the Ninth Circuit to again strike down the FCC's rule based
on AT&T Corp. See id. The Court explained that their conclusion that it is reasonable for the FCC to interpret the Communications Act to classify cable modem
service solely as an information service leaves intact the holding in AT&T Corp.
that the FCC's interpretation is not the best reading of the statute. See id.
157. See Nat'l Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n, 125 S. Ct. at 2702 (stating that FCC's
interpretation is permissible at both steps of Chevron's two-part analysis).
158. See id. at 2704-08 (analyzing "offer" in common usage and legislative history contexts).
159. See id. at 2704 (explaining that "offer" as used in definition of "telecommunications service" can reasonably be read to mean two different things). For
the definition of "telecommunications service," see supra note 63 and accompanying text.
160. See id. (distinguishing between two interpretations of "offer"). For a definition of "information service," see supra notes 65, 73, and accompanying text.
The court analogized the distinction as follows:
One might well say that a car dealership "offers" cars, but does not "offer"
the integrated major inputs that make purchasing the car valuable, such
as the engine or the chassis. It would, in fact, be odd to describe a car
dealership as "offering" consumers the car's components in addition to
the car itself. Even if it is linguistically permissible to say that the car
dealership "offers" engines when it offers cars, that shows, at most, that
the term "offer", when applied to a commercial transaction, is ambiguous
about whether it describes only the offered finished product, or the product's discrete components as well. It does not show that no other usage is
permitted.
Nat'l Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n, 125 S. Ct. at 2704.
161. See Nat'l Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n, 125 S. Ct. at 2704-05 (explaining it is
reasonable to describe finished cable modem service experienced by consumer as
single integrated offering).

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2006

29

382

Jeffrey S. Moorad
Sports&Law
Journal,
Vol.JouRNAL
13, Iss. 2 [2006], Art.
4 13: p. 353
VILLANOVA
SPORTS
ENT.
LAw
[Vol.

'offerings."' 1 6 2 The dissent responded that the high-speed transmission component necessary to provide broadband cable modem
service is necessarily "offered" with the Internet service. 163 The majority rejected this argument, stating the issue is whether the products are functionally integrated or functionally separate, which they
believe depends "on the factual particulars of how Internet technology works and how it is provided .... "164 Therefore, the Court
concluded, " [b] ecause the term 'offer' can sometimes refer to a single, finished product and sometimes to the 'individual components
in a package being offered' . . . the statute fails unambiguously to

classify the telecommunications component of cable modem ser1 65
vice as a distinct offering."
In the last step of the Chevron analysis, the Court concluded the
FCC's construction was a reasonable policy choice and therefore a
permissible reading of the Communications Act. 166 The Court reasoned that, from the end-users' perspective (i.e., a consumer), the
service that Internet providers offer is access to the Internet, not a
transparent ability to transmit information as is the case when providing a telecommunications service. 16 7 Hence, the FCC's classifica162. Id. at 2705 (explaining that it is "no misuse of language" to state that
cable companies do not offer each individual component part of Internet access,
even though each is essential to providing Internet access). The Court stated that,
"[i]n the telecommunications context, it is at least reasonable to describe cable
companies as not 'offering' each [individual] input necessary for Internet access to
the consumer." Id. at 2705 (explaining that transmission component of cable
modem service is sufficiently integrated with finished service).
163. See id. at 2714-15 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("Despite the Court's mighty labors to prove otherwise, the telecommunications component of cable-modem service retains such ample independent identity that it must be regarded as being an
offer ....." (citations omitted)).

164. Id. at 2705 (describing majority's position regarding how "functionally
integrated" versus "functionally separate" should be resolved). In the UniversalService Report, the FCC recognized that it is not always clear whether a company is
providing a single service, or two distinct services, one of which is a telecommunications service. See Universal Service Report, 13 F.C.C.R. 11501, 11530 1 60 (1998)
(discussing complexity in determining whether "telecommunications" and "information service" are mutually exclusive categories when offered by facilities based
providers (referencing Indep. Data Commc'ns Mfrs. Ass'n, Inc., Petition for Declaratory Ruling that AT&T's Interspan Frame Relay Serv. Is a Basic Serv, Mem.
Opinion and Order, 10 F.C.C.R. 1317, 13722-23, 11 40-46 (1995)).
165. Nat'l Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n, 125 S. Ct. at 2705 (noting this ambiguity
"leaves federal telecommunications policy in this technical and complex area to be
set by the [FCC] . .

").

166. See id. at 2708-10 (concluding FCC's construction maintains current regulatory structures and is consistent with Supreme Court's understanding of how
Internet works).
167. See id. at 2710 (noting that from end-users perspective, Internet access is
not merely transparent ability to transmit information because it allows users to
interact with Internet content).
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non of cable modem Internet access is not unreasonable just
because accessing the Internet via a cable modem utilizes telecom1 68
munications components.
Finally, the Court rejected respondent MCI's argument that
the FCC's treatment of cable modem service providers is an "arbitrary and capricious" deviation of agency policy under the Administrative Procedure Act because it is inconsistent with its treatment of
DSL service. 169 The Court rejected this argument, noting the FCC
provided a reasoned explanation for treating cable modem service
1 70
differently than DSL service.
168. See id. at 2705 (concluding it is reasonable to describe offering Internet
access and its transmission component as single integrated offering).
169. See id. at 2710 (concluding FCC provided reasonable explanation for different treatment). Administrative Procedure Act section 706(2)(a) reads as
follows:
To the extent necessary to decision and when presented, the reviewing
court shall decide all relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional
and statutory provisions, and determine the meaning or applicability of
the terms of an agency action. The reviewing court shall(2) hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions
found to be(A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in
accordance with law;
5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(a) (2000). MCI argued that when local telephone companies
began offering Internet access via DSL technology in addition to telephone service, the FCC required them to make the lines used to transmit DSL service available to competing ISPs on nondiscriminatory, common-carrier terms. SeeNat'l Cable
& Telecomms. Ass'n, 125 S. Ct. at 2710 (describing MCI's argument). MCI claimed
"the Commission's [FCC's] decision not to regulate cable companies similarly
under Title II is inconsistent with its DSL policy." Id.
170. See Nat'l Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n, 125 S. Ct. at 2711 (accepting FCC's
explanation that different treatment is result of different market conditions). The
FCC explained that the reason for regulating DSL service under the common-carrier scheme was that at that time telephone wires were "the primary, if not exclusive, method" used by ISPs to connect their customers to the Internet. See id.
(citing Declaratory Ruling, 17 F.C.C.R. 4798, 4825 44 (2002)) (describing FCC's
reasoning). In contrast, the FCC concluded that changed market conditions warranted different treatment of "facilities-based cable companies" providing cable
modem service. See id. (describing reasoning behind different regulatory treatment of cable modem Internet service). Currently, high-speed Internet access is
"evolving [on several] electronic platforms." Id. (citing Declaratory Ruling, 17
F.C.C.R. at 4802 6) (noting various platforms capable of delivering high-speed
Internet access). As a result, the FCC concluded that ""broadband services should
exist in a minimal regulatory environment that promotes investment and innovation in a competitive market."" Id. (quoting DeclaratoryRuling, 17 F.C.C.R. at 4802
1 5). The Court declined to address the argument that the FCC's justification for
exempting cable modem service from common carrier regulation applies equally
to DSL providers. See id. (explaining court need not address issue because it is for
FCC to reconsider).
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Critical Analysis

Although National Cable & Telecommunications Ass'n addressed a
171
telecommunications issue, it is an exercise in administrative law.
The Court addressed the proper regulatory classification of broadband cable Internet service under the Communications Act
172
through the application of the Chevron doctrine.
Despite the Ninth Circuit's refusal to apply the Chevron doctrine, the Supreme Court correctly concluded that Chevron did apply.1 73 The Supreme Court faced a challenge to an interpretation
of a statutory definition proffered by the agency with jurisdiction to
administer the applicable statute.' 74 Additionally, the FCC has explicit authority to promulgate rules and regulations that have the
force of law, and it acted within that power when it issued the De175
claratory Ruling.
Consistent with the principles of Chevron, the Court rejected
the argument that Chevron does not apply when an agency action
conflicts with past practice. 176 Chevron dictates that an agency's interpretation of ambiguities in a statute it administers receives deference, period.177 Much of the support for agency deference derives
from an agency's position to weigh competing policy considerations
in light of "everyday realities.' 178 This statement contemplates that
171. See Nat'l Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n, 125 S. Ct. at 2699-712 (demonstrating
statement by engaging in Chevron analysis).
172. See id. (deferring to FCC interpretation after applying Chevron analysis).
173. Compare Nat'l Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n, 125 S.Ct. at 2699 (concluding
Chevron applied to FCC's interpretation of "telecommunications service"), with
Brand X Internet Servs. v. FCC, 345 F.3d 1120, 1132 (concluding circuit precedent
controlled), rev'd sub nom. Nat'l Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet
Servs., 125 S. Ct. 2688 (2005).
174. See 47 U.S.C. § 151 (2000) (pending legislation S. 1753, 109th Cong. (1st
Sess. 2005)) (granting power to FCC to administer Communications Act); 47
U.S.C. § 154(i) (2000) ("The Commission may perform any and all acts, make
such rules and regulations, and issue such orders, not inconsistent with this chapter, as may be necessary in the execution of its functions.").
175. See DeclaratoryRuling, 17 F.C.C.R. 4798, 4855 115 (2002) (citing provisions which grant statutory authority to FCC for actions taken in Declaratory Ruling). These two factors satisfy the Mead doctrine which limits the scope of
Chevron's applicability. For a discussion of Mead, see supra notes 137-42 and accompanying text.
176. See Nat' Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n, 125 S. Ct. at 2699-700 (rejecting respondents' argument against applicability of Chevron).
177. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 84243 (1984) (describing Chevron's two part test). For a further discussion of Chevron,
see supra notes 130-36 and accompanying text.
178. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865-66 (describing agency as appropriate body to
make policy determinations). Further, the Chevron Court noted that an agency
could "rely upon the incumbent administration's views of wise policy to inform its
judgments." Id. at 865.
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agency policy, and therefore action in conformity therewith, will
shift as everyday realities change and potentially conflict with previous practice. 179 Indeed, in Chevron the Court deferred to an EPA
interpretation of the Clean Air Act which reversed its previous
position. 8 0
The dissent takes issue with the majority's conclusion that the
term "offer," as used in the definition of "telecommunications service," is ambiguous. 8 1 Both sides phrase the debate in terms of
whether the products at issue are functionally integrated or functionally separate. 18 2 The dissent focuses on the consumers' view,
which Justice Scalia assessed by asking "what other products cablemodem service substitutes for in the marketplace."18 3 In Justice
Scalia's view, cable modem service replaces dial-up or DSL service
184
so the consumer perceives it in the same way as those services.
Therefore, he reasons that because dial-up and DSL service require
a customer to purchase both a physical connection and an ISP to
access the Internet, consumers necessarily view cable modem service as offering a physical connection to the Internet separate from
any computing functionality.1 8 5 As a result, cable modem service
179. See id. at 865-66 (acknowledging that as members of executive branch it
is appropriate for agencies to "resolv[e] . . . competing interests . . . in light of

everyday realities"). The Court in Chevron noted that "the agency, to engage in
informed rulemaking, must consider varying interpretations and the wisdom of its
policy on a continuing basis." Id. at 863-64.
180. See id. at 857-58 (discussing change in EPA interpretation resulting from
new administration taking office).
181. See Nat'l Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n, 125 S. Ct. at 2713 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that FCC's interpretation of Communications Act is "implausible").
Justice Scalia stated, "[t] he first sentence of the FCC ruling under review reads as
follows: 'Cable modem service provides high-speed access to the Internet, as well as
many applications or functions that can be used with that access, over cable system
facilities.'" Id. (quoting DeclaratoryRuling, 17 F.C.C.R. 4798, 4799 1 (2002)). Justice Scalia asserted that the analytic problem is not what the term "offer" means,
but the identity of what is being offered. See id. at 2714. Justice Scalia believes the
relevant question is "whether the individual components in a package ... possess
sufficient identity to be described as separate objects of the offer, or whether they
have been so changed by their combination with the other components that it is
no longer reasonable to describe them in that way." Id. Ultimately, Justice Scalia
concluded that the telecommunications component of cable modem service "retains such ample independent identity that it must be regarded as being an offer."
Id. at 2714-15.
182. See id. at 2705, 2714 (noting majority and dissenting opinions defining
issue as whether product is functionally integrated or separate).
183. Id. at 2715 (analyzing replacement products for cable modem service).
184. See id. (distinguishing functional operation of DSL and dial-up from
cable modem service, and asserting customers view them similarly).
185. See id. (describing consumers' perception of broadband Internet access
platforms).

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2006

33

386

Jeffrey S. Moorad Sports Law Journal, Vol. 13, Iss. 2 [2006], Art. 4
& ENT. LAw JouRNAL [Vol. 13: p. 353

VILLANOVA SPORTS

necessarily "offers" "telecommunications" and is a "telecommunica86
tions service" under the language of the statute.'
In response, the majority notes the dissent's analysis underscores the ambiguity it described because the term "offer" can refer
to either an integrated finished product or a package of functionally separate components.' 8 7 The majority states the question turns
"not on the language of the Act, but on the factual particulars of
how Internet technology works and how it is provided, questions
Chevron leaves to the [FCC] to resolve in the first instance."18 8
The majority's position here is more persuasive because it recognizes that the agency, and not the courts, should resolve the issue.' 8 9 As the majority noted, because the term "offer" can mean
two different things, "the [Communications Act] fails unambiguously to classify the telecommunications component of cable
modem service as a distinct offering." 90 Consequently, the FCC
has the responsibility of resolving this ambiguity, and that resolution deserves deference under Chevron if it is a permissible
construction.'

91

V.

IMPACT

The Supreme Court's reversal of the Ninth Circuit's decision
and conclusion that cable modem service is an "information service" revives the FCC's Declaratory Ruling.19 2 The Supreme Court
also affirmed the FCC's authoritative role to interpret laws within its
area of expertise. 19 3 According to Chevron, the agency is the appro186. See Nat'l Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n, 125 S. Ct. at 2718 ("After all is said and
done ... it remains perfectly clear that someone who sells cable-modem service is
'offering' telecommunications.").
187. See id. at 2705 (addressing dissents analysis).
188. Id.
189. See id. at 2712 (concluding questions resolved in Declaratory Ruling are
"'technical, complex, and dynamic'" (quoting Nat'l Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n v.
Gulf Power Co. 534 U.S. 327, 339 (2002))). Thus "[t]he [FCC] is in a far better
position to address these questions than we are." Id.

190. Id. at 2705.
191. For a discussion of Chevron's presumption in favor of agency's filling statutory ambiguities, see supra notes 130-36 and accompanying text.
192. See Nat'l Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n, 125 S. Ct. at 2712 (reversing Ninth
Circuit decision vacating DeclaratoryRuling to extent it classified cable modem service as "information service").

193. See id. ("Nothing in the Communications Act or the Administrative Procedure Act makes unlawful the Commission's use of its expert policy judgment to
resolve these difficult questions."); see also Kandutsch, supra note 18, at 48 (asserting real significance is in upholding FCC's authority to interpret statutes it administers). For a further discussion of Chevron and an agency's role in interpreting
statutes it administers, see supra notes 130-36 and accompanying text.
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priate body to make policy choices when interpreting statutes
under its jurisdiction. 19 4 This principle is important here because
the FCC formulates a regulatory scheme to account for future
19 5
broadband technologies while fulfilling its statutory obligations.
The revival of the Declaratoy Ruling also means that cable operators providing Internet access via cable modem service will not be
subject to Title II obligations. 19 6 This affirmation of the FCC's deregulatory approach implies that the owners of broadband infrastructure maintain control of their networks because they do not
have to share their infrastructure. 19 7 Conversely, independent, unaffiliated ISPs lose because they require these same infrastructures
to deliver their services to consumers in the marketplace.1 9 8 Because ISPs can no longer rely on the possibility that cable modem
service providers will be subject to open access to the facilities they
require, they lose significant bargaining power when negotiating
broadband carriage agreements with cable operators and telephone companies. 9 9
One commentator suggests this result returns balance to the
marketplace. 200 It is argued that if the Supreme Court had affirmed the Ninth Circuit, resulting in open access requirements for
cable modem providers, it would result in a "government-mandated
advantage in what would otherwise be a market-based negotiation." 2 0 1

The commentator further argues that because ISPs, like

194. For an explanation of Chevron and an agency's role in interpreting statutes it administers, see supra notes 130-36 and accompanying text.
195. See Brand X Internet Servs. v. FCC, 345 F.3d 1120, 1125 (9th Cir. 2003)
(noting that 1996 Act was enacted to deal with emerging technologies). The
Ninth Circuit said, "Congress has addressed the burgeoning market for advanced
computer services in the Telecommunications Act of 1996." Id. (citations omitted). The 1996 Act sought to "provide a 'pro-competitive, de-regulatory national
policy framework,' designed to promote the 'deployment of advanced telecommunications and information technologies to all Americans by opening all telecommunications markets to competition.'" Id. (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 104-458, at 113
(1996) (Conf. Rep.)).
196. See DeclaratoryRuling, 17 F.C.C.R. 4798, 4802 7 (2002) (classifying cable
modem service as "interstate information service").
197. See Kandutsch, supra note 18, at 48 (asserting primary beneficiaries are
cable companies who do not need to share their broadband infrastructure).
198. See id. (asserting ISPs lose out because they are dependent on ability to
lease existing facilities to sell their services to consumers).
199. See id. (asserting ISPs bargaining position is weakened).
200. See Sonia Arrison, Commentary: X Marks the Start of Broadband Reform,
TECHNEwsWoRLD, July 1, 2005, http://www.technewsworld.com/story/44319.html
(opining Supreme Court decision is "good for consumers" and will result in
"much-needed" broadband policy reform).
201. Id. (asserting "when government starts picking winners and losers in the
marketplace, consumers suffer").
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Brand X, are re-sellers of cable service and do not own lines, they
do not actually introduce more competition into the broadband
20 2
marketplace.
In addition, classifying cable modem service as an information
service appears to limit the scope of local regulatory authority over
such services. 20 3 For example, regulatory requirements and fees
that local franchising authorities impose on cable operators apply
only to cable service. 20 4 Moreover, the jurisdiction of local
franchise authority does not appear to extend to "video programming or other information services." 20 5
Local franchising authorities in many communities have attempted to place conditions on cable franchise grants. 20 6 A limitation on local authority would place regulatory jurisdiction over
cable broadband Internet service solely in the FCC's hands, who
could then determine nationally whether to pursue open access
policies for cable modem service. 20 7 By centralizing power with the
FCC, it can formulate and proceed with a uniform regulatory ap202. See id. (arguing it appears ISPs create competition because to most people the "retail v. ownership structure is unclear" in broadband market). The commentator also notes that the FCC's recent proceedings to reclassify DSL as an
information service are "encouraging" for what is currently a "regulatory... mess
... from the standpoint of a 'level playing field."' Id. Another commentator even
states that ISPs have limited relevance in the broadband context because users
connect directly to the Internet without any need for an ISP (in contrast to dial-up
service). See Kandutsch, supra note 18, at 48 (noting questionable relevance of
ISPs in broadband era).
203. See Aronowitz, supra note 75, at 903 ("LFAs negotiate rates and service
improvements before granting cable providers access to the local market. But...
LFAs are not authorized to negotiate terms for cable Internet access because cable
modem service is not a cable service, and is therefore not subject to the LFA
authority.").
204. See, e.g., 47 U.S.C. § 542(b) (2000) (setting franchise fees imposed on
cable operators as percentage of revenue derived from providing "cable services").
205. Id. § 544(b) (1) (defining scope of local franchise authorities jurisdiction). This section provides that:
In the case of any franchise granted after the effective date of this subchapter, the franchising authority, to the extent related to the establishment or operation of a cable system (1) in its request for proposals for a franchise (including requests for
renewal proposals, subject to section 546 of this title), may establish requirements for facilities and equipment, but may not, except as provided
in subsection (h) of this section, establish requirements for video programming or other information services[ ]
Id. Further, the exception for subsection (h) applies to a notice requirement for
changes "in channel assignment or in the video programming service provided
over any such channel." Id. § 544(h).
206. See Duffy, supra note 90, at 1261 (listing areas across nation that mandated open access requirements as part of AT&T merger approval process).
207. See id. at 1277-80 (asserting secondary effect of information service classification is avoidance of situation in which cable modem service providers would
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proach, instead of patchwork regulations that change at geographic
boundaries. 20 8 As the broadband market develops, "the FCC
should maintain the authority to address novel questions, not mu20 9
nicipalities that deal with such issues only on an ad hoc basis."
Remaining unanswered is whether or not the FCC can or will
impose regulatory requirements on cable modem service pursuant
to its Title I ancillary jurisdiction. 210 The Supreme Court expressly
acknowledged the existence of this authority and that the FCC "remains free to impose special regulatory duties on facilities-based
ISPs under its Title I ancillary jurisdiction." 21 1 In fact, in the Declaratory Ruling, the FCC indicated it was continuing to examine the
extent to which Title I authority should be exercised to regulate
212
facilities based providers of interstate information services.
David P. Manni

potentially be "subject to highly divergent regulations from one community to the
next").
208. See id. at 1277-78 (noting chaos would ensue if each of 30,000 individual
local franchising authorities had its own regulatory structure for broadband (citing
William Kennard, Chairman Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n, Speech before the Nat'l
Cable Television Ass'n: The Road Not Taken: Building a Broadband Future for
America, Remarks Before the National Cable Television Association, (June 15,
1999), available at http://www.fcc.gov/Speeches/Kennard/spwek921.html)).
209. Id. at 1255 (asserting that granting jurisdiction to FCC has benefits "beyond the . . .fact that the Communications Act counsels such a result").

210. See Declaratory Ruling, 17 F.C.C.R. 4798, 4842
77 (2002) ("Given our
classification [o]f cable modem service as an interstate information service, we now
seek comment on whether the [FCC] should exercise its Title Iauthority here with
regard to the provision of cable modem service.").
211. Nat'l Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 125 S.Ct.
2688, 2708 (2005) (noting FCC's authority to continue regulation of cable modem
service providers under Title I). The Court addressed this in response to Respondents' argument that the Communications Act requires regulating cable companies as common-carriers because similar to telephone companies who offer
Internet access cable companies own the facilities they use to provide cable
modem service. See id. at 2707-08. The court disagreed noting that the differential
treatment resulted from a policy choice by the FCC, not the language of the Communications Act. See id. at 2708.
212. See DeclaratoryRuling, 17 F.C.C.R. at 4842
78-79 (requesting comment
related to extent to which FCC should exercise Title I authority and any explicit
statutory provisions or expressions of Congressional goals that would be furthered
by exercise of Title I authority).
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